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ABSTRACT 
An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship between Audit Committee 
Multiple Directorships and Financial Reporting Quality 
Xiaochuan Zheng 
Dr. David Campbell and Dr. Nandini Chandar, Co-Supervisors 
 
This study examines three major questions regarding the effect of audit 
committee multiple directorships (AC-MD) on financial reporting quality: (1) Is 
AC-MD associated with financial reporting quality? (2) Has the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act of 2002 (SOX) changed the incidence of AC-MD? (3) Has the association 
between AC-MD and financial reporting quality changed subsequent to SOX?  In 
addition to the audit committee as a whole, I consider the implications of multiple 
directorships (MD) of key audit committee members – chairs and financial 
experts.  
In my analyses of a sample of 3,169 firm-years consisting of non-financial 
S&P 500 firms for the years 1997 to 2005, I find that: (1) High MD on audit 
committees as a whole (HMD_AC) is not significantly associated with financial 
reporting quality; however, high MD among  audit committee chairs 
(HMD_CHAIR) and financial experts (HMD_FE) is positively related to financial 
reporting quality.  The effect of HMD_CHAIR on final reporting quality is mostly 
driven by audit committee chairs who are also financial experts and the effect of 
HMD_FE on financial reporting quality is mainly driven by low AC-MD firms; 
(2) There is an inverted U-Shaped relationship between the magnitude of AC-MD 
and financial reporting quality, with an optimum percentage of high MD members 
of about 47%; (3)Although an audit committee as a whole tends to have lower 
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MD post-SOX, key audit committee members are more likely to have higher MD 
post-SOX, consistent with greater demand for higher quality audit committee 
members post-SOX.  However, supplemental analysis reveals that these increases 
in MD post-SOX are largely due to chairs and financial experts with low MD pre-
SOX increasing their directorships post-SOX.  Those with high MD pre-SOX 
actually reduce the number of their directorships post-SOX; (4) SOX mitigates 
the positive effects of HMD_CHAIR and HMD_FE on financial reporting quality 
that are observed earlier. This study clarifies conflicting results in prior literature 
on the consequences of multiple directorships.  It further seeks to provide 
evidence on the effect of landmark corporate governance legislation - SOX - on 
the incidence of multiple directorships and its implication for the governance role 
of audit committees. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
In this dissertation, I examine the corporate governance consequence of multiple 
directorships of members of the audit committee of a company’s board of directors.  
Specifically, I investigate whether multiple directorships of audit committee members are 
associated with a firm’s financial reporting quality.  Additionally, I examine whether the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has modified the relationship between audit committee 
multiple directorships and financial reporting quality. This chapter provides an overview 
of the research questions, methods and broad findings, and describes the main framework 
of this study. The first section (Section 1.1) addresses the motivation and research 
questions. The second section (Section 1.2) presents an overview of the study. The third 
section (Section 1.3) summarizes the preliminary results. The fourth section (Section 1.4) 
highlights the contribution of this study. Finally, the last section (Section 1.5) details the 
organization of this study.  
1.1 Motivation and research questions  
The corporate governance consequence of multiple directorships is a contentious 
issue, both in practice and in academia. Many institutions and shareholder groups have 
expressed concern that multiple directorships (MD) could result in directors who are too 
busy to perform their monitoring functions effectively, and have proposed limiting the 
number of directorships held by individuals. For example, the National Association of 
Corporate Directors guidelines (NACD 1996) recommend that senior corporate 
executives and CEOs should hold no more than three outside directorships. The Council 
of Institutional Investors (CII 1998) is stricter in its recommendations, suggesting that 
individual board members with full-time jobs should not serve on more than two other 
boards. In contrast, some companies contend that multiple directorships help to enhance 
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governance effectiveness. For example, Brown-Forman’s 2004 proxy statement states, 
“Mr. O’Neil also sits on the audit committee of more than three other public companies. 
Our Board has determined that his service on other audit committees does not impair, but 
indeed enhances, his ability to sit on our Audit Committee.” (see Appendix 1).   
 There is also a vibrant academic debate on the consequences of multiple 
directorships. Prior literature provides competing predictions about the effects of “busy” 
corporate boards – i.e., the effect of board MD on governance effectiveness. Using an 
agency theoretic perspective, some studies argue that boards with high MD are associated 
with ineffective monitoring of management due to insufficient time and effort committed, 
thereby reducing the firm’s market value (e.g., Shivdasani and Yermack 1999,  Fich and 
Shivdasani 2006). On the other hand, others argue that board MD is beneficial to 
shareholders. For example, Fama and Jensen (1983), Gilson (1990), Kaplan and Reishus 
(1990), and Vafeas (1999) suggest that the labor market for directors could serve as a 
disciplining mechanism.  The value of the director’s human capital at stake increases with 
multiple directorships as the director has more to lose from any one failure. Because of 
their larger human capital at stake, directors with higher MD are subject to greater labor 
market discipline and thus have greater incentives to be diligent in performing their 
monitoring functions. In addition, MD provides directors with valuable experience and 
the ability to import knowledge and “best practices” from other firms. Therefore, the 
effect of MD on the effectiveness of board governance is inconclusive as there are both 
costs (more time constraints, leading to possible shirking by the director) and benefits 
(increased human capital effect and knowledge transfer) to MD. Empirical findings in 
prior literature also provide mixed results. While some studies find that a higher average 
  
3  
number of additional directorships is positively associated with governance effectiveness 
(e.g., Coles and Hoi 2003, Harris and Shimizu 2004), others find a negative association 
(e.g., Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999, Fich and Shivdasani 2006).  
Much of prior research has examined MD at the board level. However, given its 
diverse functions, a board typically operates through its committees. Each committee has 
unique challenges in terms of time commitments and expertise. Membership on audit 
committees has been particularly demanding in this respect. For example, a survey 
conducted by Corporate Board Member magazine in 2005 shows that “audit committee 
members continue to be the busiest” (Corporate Board Member magazine 2006 pp.1). 
The survey finds that audit committees convene on average seven times per year  with the 
majority of committees (62 percent) meeting for three to four hours, while other board 
committees—governance/nominating and compensation—typically meet less frequently 
(four times per year) and for shorter periods of time.  The effect of MD on committee 
effectiveness therefore might be different for different committees.  
 In this study, I examine multiple directorships at the audit committee level.  The 
first general question that this study addresses is whether audit committee multiple 
directorships (AC-MD) is associated with audit committee effectiveness as represented 
by a firm’s financial reporting quality. In addition to examining MD at the level of the 
audit committee, this study also examines the impact of MD of key members of the audit 
committee – the audit committee chair (AC-CHAIR) and financial experts (AC-FE).     
Another major focus of this study is to investigate the impact of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which has brought about the most sweeping changes in 
corporate governance in decades.  An important focus of SOX has been the audit 
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committee, whose major role is to oversee financial reporting quality. For example, SOX 
section 301 requires 100% audit committee independence and section 407 requires 
companies to disclose whether or not they have a financial expert on their committees. 
Considering the increasingly important role of the audit committee in the post SOX era, 
the second research question is whether SOX has changed the incidence of the AC-MD.  
Finally, the third research question addressed in this study is whether the association 
between AC-MD and financial reporting quality has changed subsequent to SOX.   
1.2 Overview of the Study 
Consistent with Klein (2002a), this study examines non-financial S&P 500 
companies. The final sample size, after accounting for data availability, is 544 companies 
and 3,169 firm-years for the period 1997 to 2005.  
This study measures MD at both individual (each AC member) level and group 
(AC) level instead of simply taking the average number of directorships as suggested by 
most prior literature. At the individual AC member level, I initially use three 
directorships as a threshold to separate High MD from Low MD AC members. At the 
committee level, I code a binary variable (HMD_AC) as one if a majority of the AC 
members (more than 50%)1 have high MD. 
In addition, as the main focus of this study is the impact of multiple directorships 
(MD) on financial reporting quality, I consider not just whether the audit committee as a 
whole has high MD, but also who on the audit committee has high MD – i.e., whether it 
makes a difference if the focal points of influence within the audit committee, like the 
chair and the financial expert, are stretched too thin with multiple directorships.  This 
may be an important consideration because Libby, Trotman and Zimmer (1987) suggest 
                                                 
1 The rationale behind this definition is that majority rule dominates committee actions (Klein  2002a). 
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that a group member with perceived expertise has an influential position in the group 
decision. There is also anecdotal evidence that group decision making is likely influenced 
by herding and free rider effects (Daniels et al. 2005)2. Furthermore, Loderer and Peyer 
(2002) find a negative association between the average number of multiple directorships 
held by board members and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q; however, they do find 
that the number of directorships held by the chairman of the board is positively associated 
with firm value, suggesting there might be different effects on corporate governance 
between AC-MD at committee level and AC-MD at focal points level. 
This study is conducted in several stages.  First, I consider the overall question of 
whether AC-MD is associated with measures commonly considered to proxy for financial 
reporting quality.  In doing so, I provide an analysis of multiple directorships both at the 
audit committee level and at the individual level.  To measure financial reporting quality, 
I adopt three commonly used proxies for earnings quality: abnormal accruals, accounting 
restatements and earnings informativeness. The first measure, the absolute value of 
abnormal accruals, is based on the performance matched modified Jones model (see 
Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 2005, Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper 2005). I 
regress the absolute value of abnormal accruals on AC-MD and pertinent control 
variables to test the effect of AC-MD on financial reporting quality. I also examine the 
effect of AC-MD on financial reporting quality using accounting restatements as an 
alternate proxy for financial reporting quality.  Finally I use a third proxy – earnings 
informativeness – to measure financial reporting quality.  My measures of earnings 
                                                 
2 In this survey, some audit committee chairs complained that their audit members adopt an attitude: “if it is 
okay with you, it is okay with us” during the meeting 
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informativeness examine the significance of both the levels of, and the changes in 
earnings related to stock returns. 
Next, I investigate the impact of a recent regulation affecting audit committees –
the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).  The question of how SOX has influenced the 
composition and effectiveness of audit committees is interesting and important because 
SOX has significantly changed the corporate governance environment and has increased 
the visible role played by audit committees and audit committee members. I first examine 
whether SOX has changed the incidence of AC-MD by using logistic regression models.  
Next, I examine whether the association between AC-MD and financial reporting quality 
has significantly changed subsequent to SOX by regressing a financial reporting quality 
proxy on the interaction term of SOX and AC-MD.  
1.3 Summary of results 
There are several interesting findings in this study. First, I do not find a significant 
association between AC-MD and financial reporting quality at the audit committee 
level(HMD_AC).  However, I do find that there is a significantly positive association 
between high MD of audit committee chairs (HMD_CHAIR), or audit committee 
financial experts (HMD_FE)  and financial reporting quality, after controlling for other 
determinants of earnings quality. However, in supplemental analyses, when I distinguish 
between audit committee chairs who are also financial experts from those who are not 
financial experts, I find that the effect of HMD_CHAIR on financial reporting quality is 
driven by the those chairs who are also financial experts. Interestingly, when I use 
earnings informativess to proxy the financial reporting quality, I find that only HMD_FE 
is associated with high financial reporting quality, suggesting that market perceives the 
difference between HMD_CHAIR and HMD_FE.  
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Second, I find that there is an inverted U-shaped relation between the magnitude 
of multiple directorships, as measured by the percentage of audit committee members 
who are classified as high MD, and financial reporting quality.  This suggests that 
including members with high MD in a committee is beneficial only to certain extent; 
beyond that, the costs of high multiple directorships in terms of overextension of the 
director, outweigh the benefits, resulting in deterioration in financial reporting quality.   
I also find some interesting SOX effects relating to multiple directorships.  I find 
that an audit committee as a whole tends to have lower MD post-SOX. However, an audit 
committee chair or financial expert is more likely to have high MD post-SOX than pre-
SOX. Further analysis indicates that the results about key members are largely driven by 
those members who had low-MD pre-SOX.  Audit committee chairs and financial experts 
with high MD pre SOX actually reduce their directorships post-SOX.   
Finally, I find that SOX mitigates the positive association of HMD_CHAIR and 
HMD_FE on financial reporting quality.   These findings are consistent with increased 
costs of multiple directorships post SOX, which is reinforced by my finding that the 
number of audit committee meetings significantly increases post SOX.    
1.4 Contribution of the Study 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways.  First it draws the 
literature about multiple directorships into the arena of audit committees by specifically 
investigating the impact of audit committees with high MD on financial reporting quality. 
Arguably, financial reporting quality – proxied for by measures such as discretionary 
accruals– is a less noisy measure of board monitoring effectiveness than broader 
measures such as firm performance.  The board of directors’ dual role as advisor as well 
as monitor of management (Adams and Ferreira 2007) complicates efforts to establish a 
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direct link between overall board governance and firm performance.  In contrast, since 
the main role of the audit committee is to oversee financial reporting quality (monitoring 
role), the link between financial reporting quality and audit committee effectiveness is 
more direct.  
This study also contributes to the literature on audit committee effectiveness.  
Prior literature in this area focuses on audit committee characteristics such as 
independence and financial expertise (e.g., Klein 2002a; Bédard, Chtourou, and Courteau 
2004; Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt 2003).  These studies generally find that an audit 
committee composed of a majority of independent directors is positively associated with 
financial reporting quality and that audit committee member financial expertise enhances 
committee performance.  Yang and Krishnan (2005) and Carcello and Neal (2003) use 
multiple directorships as one of the defining characteristics of audit committees in 
examining the relationship between audit committee characteristics and audit committee 
effectiveness.  My study extends these prior studies in three ways.  First, these prior 
studies measure multiple directorships as the average number of directorships.  
According to Fich and Shivdasani (2006), the average number measurement fails to 
consider the extreme skewness in the distribution of directorships (see Appendix 2).  
Consistent with Fich and Shivdasani (2006), I define high AC-MD as one in which more 
than 50% of committee members have high MD. The rationale behind this definition is 
that majority rule dominates committee actions (Klein 2002a). Second, this study 
considers multiple directorships both at the committee level and at the key individual or 
“focal point” level. Third, these prior studies consider only pre-SOX data, while my study 
extends to the post-SOX period, which is marked by significant shifts in the corporate 
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governance environment. This study examines the effect of SOX on the incidence of 
multiple directorships and its implication for the governance role of audit committees. 
Finally, by focusing on all non-financial S&P 500 firms, this study examines a more 
comprehensive set of firms in comparison to prior literature. So, it examines corporate 
governance characteristics of firms that are widely owned, and for whom the benefits of 
corporate governance clearly outweigh the costs.  
1.5 Organization of the Study  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 illustrates the 
background and reviews the relevant literature. Chapter 3 formulates the hypotheses and 
describes the models. Chapter 4 describes the sample and presents the empirical results.  
Chapter 5 discusses the implication of the paper and concludes.  
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Boards of directors assume an oversight role to mitigate the agency problem 
resulting from the separation of corporate management and ownership (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976, Fama and Jensen 1983). This oversight role involves appointing the 
CEO, approving business strategy, monitoring control systems, liaising with external 
auditors, etc. Given its diverse responsibilities, the board of directors typically delegates 
its oversight activities to different committees. The audit committee is one of these 
committees and its main responsibility is to oversee financial reporting.  
2.1 Audit Committees & Regulation---Historical Perspective 
Audit committees play a pivotal role in the context of corporate governance. The 
importance of the audit committee has been recognized by the U.S. Congress, the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Stock Exchanges and the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). In terms of the hierarchy of regulations on audit 
committees, the highest level is Congressional law, followed by SEC regulations, Stock 
Exchange rules and AICPA guidelines.  
2.1.1 Overview of the evolution of regulation on audit committee 
Early regulations on audit committees started in 1974 when the SEC amended 
Regulation 14A dealing with the proxy rules. In this amendment, public companies were 
required to disclose the existence of audit committees and the names of the committee 
members in their proxy statements. Since then, little had changed until the late 1990s 
when pervasive earnings management practices caught the attention of the regulators.  
The past decade has witnessed dramatic changes in regulations relating to audit 
committees. In response to concerns about earnings management (e.g., Levitt 1998) and 
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the recent highly publicized financial reporting scandals (e.g., Enron), regulatory 
measures and legislative reforms have been put in place to try to increase the audit 
committee’s monitoring effectiveness in the financial reporting process.  
A recent milestone in the evolution of audit committee reform is the Blue Ribbon 
Panel report. In September 1998 the SEC, the NYSE and the NASDAQ formed a Blue 
Ribbon Panel to make recommendations on strengthening the role of audit committees in 
overseeing the corporate financial reporting process (SEC Press Release, 1998). In 
February 1999, the panel released its famous ten recommendations focusing on 
independence and financial literacy & expertise of audit committee members. Based on 
these recommendations, the NYSE and the NASDAQ modified their audit committee 
requirements for companies listed on their exchanges. 
A second recent milestone is the passage of SOX in 2002 following accounting 
and corporate governance scandals like Enron and WorldCom.  SOX attaches a great deal 
of importance to the role of the audit committee. It dramatically expands the scope of 
audit committees by providing for new responsibilities such as pre-approving non-audit 
services and increasing the monitoring effectiveness of the committee by such measures 
as providing whistle-blower protection. In addition, some of audit committee 
requirements that existed under the Blue Ribbon recommendations have been highlighted 
and emphasized under SOX. For example, Section 301 of SOX requires that all members 
of audit committees be independent, and Section 407 of SOX requires that companies 
disclose whether or not there is at least one financial expert in the audit committee. 
Accordingly, the  SEC , the NYSE and the NASDAQ have updated their regulations 
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following the passage of SOX. For example, in late January of 2003, the SEC published 
its final rules to implement Section 407 of SOX.   
2.1.2 Regulation on audit committee Pre-Sarbanes-Oxley  
The latest regulations on audit committee before the passage of SOX were the 
ones in response to the Blue Ribbon Panel recommendations. In late 1999, the SEC 
issued new rules to improve disclosures related to audit committees. In the meantime, 
stock exchanges also amend their exchange rules to accommodate these 
recommendations. These detailed rules required by the exchanges are summarized as 
follows. 
Independence. Independence problems were most prevalent before the issuance 
of Blue Ribbon Panel recommendation. In this regard, the modified exchange rules 
(issued in December 1999, hereafter refer to as “1999 exchange rules”) of both exchanges 
(NYSE and NASDAQ) prohibited former employees, intermediate family members, and   
a person with a cross compensation link3 issue from being an audit committee member. 
The difference between the NYSE and the NASDAQ in terms of the independence 
requirement is the limitation on business relationships. In general, NYSE listed 
companies have more flexibility with respect to business relationships, as the board as a 
whole makes a subjective assessment as to whether these relationships impact the 
directors’ business judgment. NASDAQ/AMEX rules are more objective - for example, 
an attorney practicing law in private practice does not meet the definition of 
independence if more than 5 percent or $200,000 of their firm’s revenue is generated 
from the company whose board they serve on. This attorney could meet the NYSE 
                                                 
3Cross-compensation committee links occur when a director of Co. A receives compensation from Co. B 
and a Co. A executive serves on the compensation committee of Co. B. The Co. B executive cannot serve 
on the audit committee of Co. A.  
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definition of independence if the board determines that the relationship does not impair 
the independence of the attorney’s judgment. 
Financially literate.    As a result of the 1999 exchange rules, both the NYSE and 
the NASDAQ require that all AC members are financially literate. For the NYSE, 
financial literacy is subject to interpretation by the board of directors; while for the 
NASDAQ, financial literacy is defined as “being able to read and understand 
fundamental financial statements.”  As for the distinction between accounting and 
financial expertise, both the NYSE and the NASDAQ require that at least one AC 
member possess accounting/finance expertise. However, the two stock exchanges have 
different definitions of accounting/finance expertise. NYSE rules state that members 
must have accounting or related financial management expertise, as the company’s board 
interprets such qualification in its business judgment.  NASDAQ rules on the other hand 
state that members must have past employment experience in finance or accounting, 
requisite professional certification in accounting, or any other comparable experience or 
background which results in the individual’s financial sophistication, including being or 
having been a chief executive officer, chief financial officer, or other senior officer with 
financial oversight responsibilities. 
2.1.3 Regulation of Audit Committees Post-Sarbanes-Oxley  
General speaking, SOX enhances the regulation on audit committee by legislating 
federal requirements and responsibilities of the audit committee (Klein 2003). 
Specifically, in terms of the requirements for independence and financial 
expertise, Sections 301 and 407 of SOX are very similar to the 1999 exchange rules. For 
example, Section 301 mandates that each audit committee member must be independent.  
And the definition of independence is similar to the one in the 1999 exchange rules. 
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Section 407 of SOX requires that companies disclose whether or not there is at least one” 
financial expert” in the audit committee. The key difference is that the term “financial 
expert” is defined by SEC under SOX. 
In addition to placing requirements relating to independence and financial 
expertise on a higher step in the hierarchy of board regulations by virtue of its 
congressional mandate, SOX has dramatically expanded the scope of responsibilities and 
authority of the audit committee. Section 202 mandates that the audit committee should 
pre-approve most non-auditing services. Section 301 states that the audit committee is 
directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the auditor, who 
must directly report to the audit committee. Also, section 301 gives the audit committee 
the authority to engage independent counsel and other advisors as necessary to carry out 
its duties. In addition, section 301 requires each audit committee establish procedures to 
deal with complaints regarding accounting and auditing related matters. 
  
2.2 Academic Research---Related Streams of Research  
2.2.1 Agency Theory and the Economic Demand for an Audit committee 
According to agency theory, the separation of corporate management and 
ownership results in an agency problem: the management (agents) may not always act in 
the interests of the shareholders (principals). (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Fama and 
Jensen 1983).  To mitigate the agency problem, boards of directors assume an oversight 
role involves appointing the CEO, approving business strategy, monitoring control 
systems, liaising with external auditors, etc. Agency theory would suggest that a firm’s 
demand for an audit committee is associated with the magnitude of its agency problem. 
Given its diverse responsibilities, the board of directors typically delegates its oversight 
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activities to different committees. The audit committee is one of these committees and its 
main responsibility is to oversee financial reporting. 
Consistent with the agency theory, a number of studies of audit committees argue 
that a firm’s demand for specific audit committee characteristics is associated with its 
monitoring needs. For example, Klein (2002b) finds that audit committee independence 
is negatively associated with growth opportunities. She interprets this result as indicating 
that investors in high growth firms rely less on financial statements, and therefore 
demand less monitoring functions from audit committee. Following a similar reasoning, 
Beasley and Salterio (2001) find that voluntary increases in the number of outside audit 
committee members are positively associated with board size and the separation of the 
CEO and board chair roles.  
My study also examines audit committee effectiveness from an agency 
perspective.  
2.2.2 Audit Committee Characteristics and Monitoring Effectiveness 
Prior literature in this area focuses on audit committee characteristics such as 
independence and financial expertise. Early research 4 on audit committee effectiveness 
focuses on the effects of the presence of audit committee on the financial reporting 
quality and the market reaction to the presence of audit committee. The general finding is 
that there is a positive relation between the presence of an audit committee and the firm’s 
financial reporting quality. For example, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991) document that 
overstatement errors in annual earnings are less likely among firms that have an audit 
committee. Wild (1996) finds that the earnings response coefficients for companies that 
formed audit committees are higher following the appointment of an audit committee. 
                                                 
4 Before the formation of Blue Ribbon Panel 
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With the significant changes in regulations relating to audit committees starting in 
late 1990, this line of research has shifted focus to the characteristics of the audit 
committee. The two major audit committee attributes examined thus far in the literature 
are independence and financial expertise.  
The independence literature includes studies which simply classify audit 
committee members as either “insiders” or “outsiders” ( e.g., Collier and Gregory 1999, 
Menon and Williams 1994 ) and studies that consider “grey directors” who are not 
insiders but still have close connections to management (e.g., Carcello and Neal 2000).  
One stream of the independence studies provides evidence that audit committee 
independence strengthens the audit function by hiring high quality external auditors and 
protecting external auditors who issue going-concern opinion. For example, Abbott and 
Parker (2000) find that audit committee with all outsider members are more likely to hire 
industry specialist external auditors. Carcello and Neal (2003) find that companies with 
higher percentage of insider and grey audit committee members are more likely to change 
external auditors after receiving a going –concern report.  
Another stream of the independence studies finds a positive relation between the 
audit committee independence and earnings quality. For example, Klein (2002a) detects a 
negative association between earnings management (proxied by absolute abnormal 
accruals) and audit committee independence (measured by both percentage and 50% 
threshold). However, she does not find a significant difference between audit committees 
with a majority of independent members and a board made up of the more stringent 
100% independent members as required by the NYSE and the NASDAQ. Abbott, Parker 
and Peters (2002) document evidence that companies with a larger proportion of 
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independent audit committee members are less likely to have financial reporting 
restatements and fraud.  
As for financial expertise, current empirical evidence (e.g., Krishnan 2005, 
Carcello et al. 2006, Defond et al. 2005, Bédard et al. 2004, Xie et al. 2003) is consistent 
with the expectation that an audit committee member with financial expertise enhances 
committee performance. However, these studies measure financial expertise differently. 
Bedard et al. (2004) use a strict definition of audit committee financial expertise, and find 
it is positively  associated with earnings quality. Xie et al. (2003) find that investment 
banking experience is effective in improving earnings quality. In addition, Defond et al. 
(2005) suggest that accounting expertise rather than  broader financial expertise improves 
the audit committee’s effectiveness. However, Carcello et al. (2006) split non-accounting 
financial experts into two groups, “senior business executives” and “other non-
accounting experts”, and  find a negative relation between “other non-accounting 
experts” (mostly are financial analysis experts) and earnings management, 
Collectively, prior literature indicates significant benefits associated with audit 
committee independence and audit committee financial expertise. My study complements 
this stream of research by examining audit committee effectiveness from the multiple 
directorships perspective.  
2.2.3 Multiple Directorships (MD) of board members and Monitoring Effectiveness 
An often-heard criticism of corporate boards is that outside directors only give 
limited time to performing their monitoring role (Vafeas 1999) .Echoing this criticism, 
corporate governance activists proposed restriction on how many outside board seats 
individual directors may hold. For example, the National Association of Corporate 
Directors (NACD) guidelines recommend that senior corporate executives and CEOs 
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should hold no more than three outside directorships. The Council of Institutional 
Investors is stricter, suggesting that individuals with full-time jobs should not serve on 
more than two other boards. In contrast, some companies consider that multiple 
directorship help to enhance governance effectiveness. For instance, the Business 
Roundtable (1997) believes that it is inappropriate to limit the number of directorships. In 
academics, there is also a heated debate on the issue of multiple directorships. 
2.2.3.1 MD of board members and governance effectiveness  
Using an agency theoretic perspective, some studies argue that boards with high 
MD are associated with ineffective monitoring of management due to the insufficient 
time and efforts committed, which reduces the firm’s market value (e.g., Shivdasani and 
Yermack 1999, Fich and Shivdasani 2006). Studies also provide empirical evidence 
consistent with this hypothesis. For example, using the Forbes 500 as their sample, Fich 
and Shivdasani (2006) document that  firms with high MD boards (more than 50% 
directors hold at least three directorships) exhibit lower market to book ratios, weaker 
profitability, and lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. Loderer and 
Peyer (2002) also find a negative association between the average number of multiple 
directorships held by board members and firms value (Tobin’s Q) by examining all firms 
traded in Zurich Stock Exchange. Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) investigate the 
multiple directorship issue at the committee level by examining the compensation 
committees of 205 publicly traded U.S firms over three-year period (1982-1984). They 
find that CEO pay is excessive in firms with high MD boards, suggesting that multiple 
directorships have a negative effect on board effectiveness.  
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On the other hand, others argue that multi-directorships is beneficial to 
shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983) posit that the number of directorships constitutes 
reputational capital for the director and might be a source of valuable experience. Gilson 
(1990) and Vafeas (1999) suggest that shareholders might view the directors with multi-
directorship as high quality directors. Moreover, Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard 
(2003) argue that multi-directorship might provide a director with a greater diversity of 
experience.  According to these arguments, firms with high MD directors might signal a 
high quality board. As a result, there might be a positive association between high MD 
board and firm performance.  Empirical evidence is also consistent this argument. For 
example, using strategic decisions like mergers and acquisitions to proxy for governance 
effectiveness, Harris and Shimizu (2004) find a positive relationship between the 
percentage of high MD directors and board effectiveness. In addition, although Loderer 
and Peyer (2002) find a negative association between the average number of multiple 
directorships held by board members and firm value, they do find that the number of 
directorships held by the chairman of the board is positively associated with firm value, 
suggesting that while high multiple directorships on average is not value maximizing, 
high multiple directorships by a key board member might provide a positive signal.  
Collectively, this line of research provides mixed results by using some broad 
measure of multiple directorships like the average number of board seats held by each 
director and associating this with different proxies for board effectiveness. 
There is a relative dearth of attention in the literature on the relationship between 
multiple directorships and board effectiveness at the committee level. Given its diverse 
role, a board typically functions at committee level. This study examines the impact of 
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multiple directorships on audit committee effectiveness.  Arguably, financial reporting 
quality – proxied for by measures such as discretionary accruals and earnings response 
coefficients – is a less noisy measure of board monitoring effectiveness than broader 
measures such as firm performance.  The board’s dual role as advisor as well as monitor 
of management (Adams and Ferreira 2007) complicates efforts to establish a direct link 
between overall board governance and firm performance.  In contrast, since the main role 
of the audit committee is to oversee financial reporting quality (monitoring role), the link 
between financial reporting quality and audit committee effectiveness is more direct.  
2.2.3.2 MD of audit committee members and earnings management 
Some studies (e.g., Yang and Krishnan 2005, Carcello and Neal 2003) include 
multiple directorships as one of the defining characteristics of audit committees in 
examining the relationship between audit committee characteristics and audit committee 
effectives. Using a random sample of 250 U.S public firms from the pre-SOX era, Yang 
and Krishnan (2005) find that audit committee directors’ experience on other boards 
(measured by number of directorships) is significantly associated with lower quarterly 
discretionary accruals. Carcello and Neal (2003) show a negative relation between 
average audit committees’ MD and the likelihood of dismissing an auditor following a 
going concern opinion. However, both papers use pre-SOX data and Carcello and Neal 
(2003) examine a small sample in an extreme situation (firms with going concern 
opinion). In addition, both of them use the average number of additional directorships to 
measure audit committee MD. There are two potential problems arising from this simple 
measurement. First, according to Fich and Shivdasani (2006), the average number 
measurement fails to consider the extreme skewness in the distribution of directorships.  
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Second, this measurement might not capture the “focal point” effect in audit committee 
decision processes. Libby et al. (1987) suggests that a group member with perceived 
expertise has an influential position in group decision settings. There is also anecdotal 
evidence that group decision is likely involved with herding effect and free rider effect 
(Daniels et al. 2005).  The effect of high MD of a key or focal board member may 
therefore be different from the effect of high MD of a non-key member. 
This study extends prior literature on the association between AC-MD and 
financial reporting quality (e.g., Yang and Krishnan 2005, Carcello and Neal 2003) in 
three ways.  First, I define high AC-MD as one in which more than 50% of committee 
members have high MD. The rationale behind this definition is that majority rule 
dominates committee actions (Klein 2002a). To some extent, this measurement would 
mitigate the drawback of the simple measurement of average number of directorships. 
Second, I consider multiple directorships both at the committee level and at the key 
individual or “focal point” level. Third, these prior studies consider only pre-SOX data, 
while my study extends to the post-SOX period, which is marked by what is arguably the 
most sweeping reforms in corporate governance in nearly a century. This study examines 
the effect of SOX on the incidence of multiple directorships and its implication for the 
governance role of audit committees. Finally this study examines a more comprehensive 
set of firms in comparison to prior literature; this study focuses on all non-financial S& P 
500 firms. So, it examines corporate governance characteristics of firms that are widely 
owned, and for whom the benefits of corporate governance clearly outweigh the costs.  
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CHAPTER 3: DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
As described in Chapter 1, the objective of my research is to examine the 
implications of multiple directorships of audit committee members.  This chapter 
develops specific hypotheses relating to audit committee multiple directorships (AC-MD) 
and designs models to test these hypotheses.  The first section (Section 3.1) develops the 
hypotheses and the second section (Section 3.2) discusses the research design and 
empirical models.  
3.1 Hypotheses Development 
In this dissertation I examine the effect of audit committee multiple directorships 
(AC-MD) on financial reporting quality.  My research will be conducted in several 
stages.  First, I consider the overall question of whether AC-MD is associated with 
measures commonly considered to proxy for financial reporting quality.  In doing so, I 
provide an analysis of multiple directorships both at the audit committee level and at the 
individual level.  Next, I investigate the impact of a recent regulation affecting audit 
committees –the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).  The question of how SOX has 
influenced the composition and effectiveness of audit committees is interesting and 
important because SOX has significantly changed the corporate governance environment 
and has increased the visible role played by audit committees and audit committee 
members. I first examine whether SOX has changed the incidence of AC-MD.  Next, I 
examine whether the association between AC-MD and financial reporting quality has 
significantly changed subsequent to SOX.  For each question that I investigate, I consider 
multiple directorships at the audit committee level as well as multiple directorships of 
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key or focal AC members – the audit committee chair and the audit committee financial 
expert. 
This section develops specific hypotheses relating to these three broad research 
questions.  The first part of this section (Section 3.1.1) addresses my fundamental 
research question by developing hypotheses relating to the effect of AC-MD on financial 
reporting quality.  The second part (Section 3.1.2) investigates the SOX effect on the 
incidence of AC-MD. The third part (Section 3.1.3) examines the effect of SOX on the 
relation between AC-MD and financial reporting quality. 
3.1.1 The effect of audit committee  multiple directorships (AC-MD) on financial 
reporting quality 
The audit committee is a key sub-committee of the board and its main 
responsibility is to oversee financial reporting and control. Because of the costs and 
benefits associated with MD, as discussed in section 2, there are both potentially positive 
and negative effects of AC-MD on audit committee effectiveness. An audit committee 
member with high MD might be overcommitted and therefore contribute less time and 
effort to audit committee service. On the other hand, an audit committee member with 
high MD might contribute to its effective functioning as he or she might bring more 
experience (knowledge transfer effect) and have stronger incentives to monitor because 
of higher reputational capital at stake (labor market effect).  As discussed in section 2, 
both time commitment and expertise are important to audit committee effectiveness.  
Therefore, the overall effect of MD on audit committee effectiveness is uncertain. Since 
the main role of the audit committee is to oversee financial reporting, I use measures that 
proxy for financial reporting quality as indicative of audit committee effectiveness.    
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Based on the above analysis, the direction of the relation between the AC-MD and 
financial reporting quality is ambiguous. Therefore, the first hypothesis in this study is 
nondirectional and states: 
H1a: Ceteris paribus, AC-MD is associated with  a firm’s financial reporting quality.   
In order to understand the issue of AC-MD in greater depth, I also examine the 
distribution of MD within the audit committee. Specifically, I examine the impact of MD 
of focal members of the audit committee – the chair and financial experts.  Prior research 
has only examined multiple directorships broadly, without specifically examining this 
issue at the individual level.  It is possible that what is important from a corporate 
governance perspective is not whether the board as a whole is “busy” but who on the 
board is “busy.”  Research on decision making suggests that group leaders and experts 
may have a disproportionate influence on group decisions. For example, Libby et al. 
(1987) suggests that a group member with perceived expertise has an influential position 
in group decision settings. There is also anecdotal evidence that group decision is likely 
subject to herding effects and free rider effects (Daniels et al. 2005).  Therefore, it is 
possible that MD of focal audit committee members like chairs and financial experts 
affects governance effectiveness differently when compared with MD of non-focal 
committee members.   
Because of the costs and benefits associated with MD, there are also both positive 
and negative effects of MD of focal members on audit committee effectiveness. 
Therefore, the direction of the relation between the MD of audit committee focal 
members and the financial reporting quality is an empirical question. Accordingly, H1b 
and H1c are stated as follows: 
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H1b: Ceteris Paribus, MD of audit committee chairs are associated with financial 
reporting quality. 
H1c: Ceteris Paribus, MD of audit committee financial experts are associated with 
financial reporting quality. 
3.1.2 The effect of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on  Audit Committee Multiple 
Directorships  
As discussed in section 2, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) has brought about 
sweeping changes in corporate governance and dramatically increased the profile of audit 
committees.  SOX has also significantly expanded the scope of responsibilities and 
authority of the audit committee, while changing the legal environment in which it 
operates.  I examine the implications of this landmark corporate governance legislation 
for both the incidence and consequences of AC multiple directorships. 
SOX has potentially had an impact on the demand for suitably qualified audit 
committee members. It is clear that SOX has increased both the expectations and 
workload for audit committees. For example, the Daniels et al. (2005) survey of audit 
committee chairs finds that audit committee service is more demanding after SOX 
because of the new regulatory requirements (such as the internal control assessment 
requirement in SOX), perceived heightened legal liabilities and market expectations. 
They observe that (pp 59) “audit committees are meeting more often and for longer 
periods. Committee work typically requires much more preparation and communications 
in between meetings. ”  Consistent with increasing expectations and responsibilities 
associated with audit committees, the Daniels et al. (2005)  survey shows that many 
boards have rushed to add highly qualified people to their audit committees since the 
passage of SOX. Another possible reason for the increased demand for suitably qualified 
audit committee members is the SOX requirement that AC boards have designated 
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“financial experts.”   Further, it is possible that firms might be more motivated to seek 
high quality and high profile individuals to sit on their audit committees as a way to 
signal higher corporate governance and financial reporting quality in the post Enron era.  
As a result, well qualified audit committee members, such as a prominent audit 
committee chair and a well-known financial expert could be more in demand post-SOX, 
suggesting a SOX-induced increase in multiple directorships among this group.  
However, the increased time commitment required to serve on audit committees post-
SOX as well as the heightened legal environment surrounding audit committees, implies 
that individuals serving on audit committees are likely to reduce the number of multiple 
directorships post-SOX.  Additionally, many corporations might optimally reduce the 
size of their audit committees by dropping relatively unknown or underqualified audit 
committee members with a view to increasing monitoring efficiency.  These forces could 
have opposing effects on audit committee multiple directorships in general, and the 
multiple directorships of key members like audit committee chairs and financial experts 
in particular. 
Therefore, the change of incidence of audit committee with high MD or   key 
members with high MD post-SOX is an open empirical question.  Thus, the second set of 
hypotheses in this study in this study are also nondirectional: 
 
H2a: The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) has changed the incidence of audit 
committees with high multiple directorships. 
 
H2b:: The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) has changed the incidence of audit 
committee chairs  with high multiple directorships. 
 
H2c:  The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) has changed the incidence of audit 
committee financial experts with high multiple directorships. 
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3.1.3 The effect of SOX on  the relation between AC-MD and financial reporting 
quality 
If SOX has increased the extent of AC-MD, the effect of this increase on firm 
financial reporting quality is an open question.  There are several reasons why SOX has 
potentially influenced the relation between AC-MD and financial reporting quality.  On 
the one hand, it is conceivable that SOX has dramatically increased the time commitment 
of an audit committee member. For example, the Huron 2006 Audit Committee Research 
Report shows that the average number of audit committee meetings nearly doubled from 
just over five to about ten meetings over the period 2002 to 2005. As a result, it is 
possible that multiple directorships causes audit committee members to be more over-
extended, resulting in a lower level of time commitment and effort in monitoring a 
particular firm, leading to lower audit committee effectiveness. On the other hand, SOX 
has put audit committees in the spotlight. In addition, it is possible that the post Enron 
period has increased the direct legal penalties as well as labor market penalties for 
corporate governance failures in general.  Given that audit committee members with 
multiple directorships have more of their human capital at stake, it is conceivable that 
AC-MD is associated with better monitoring outcomes post-SOX. Therefore, the 
direction of the influence of SOX on the effects of AC-MD on financial reporting quality 
is unclear.  Accordingly, the third hypotheses in this study states: 
H3a: Ceteris paribus, SOX has changed the association between AC-MD and financial 
reporting quality.  
 
Audit committee focal points, – chairs and financial experts –have a higher level 
of responsibility in post SOX era. For example, the Daniels et al. (2005) survey finds that 
audit committee work requires more preparation and communication in between meetings 
post SOX which results in the much longer working hours for audit chairs. Therefore, the 
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audit committee focal points with high MD might have more time constraints post SOX. 
At the same time, SOX has potentially increased the demand for high quality audit 
committee chairs and financial experts and accordingly raised the profile of these audit 
committee focal points. As a result, it is conceivable there is more labor market discipline 
on audit committee focal points post SOX, leading to more positive monitoring 
outcomes. Hence, the direction of the influence of SOX on the association between MD 
of AC focal points and financial reporting quality is ambiguous. Therefore, H3b is stated 
as follows: 
H3b: Ceteris paribus, SOX has changed the association between audit committee 
chairs MD and financial reporting quality.  
 
H3c: Ceteris paribus, SOX has changed the association between audit committee 
financial experts MD and financial reporting quality.  
 
3.2 Research Design  
In order to examine the relationship between multiple directorships and financial 
reporting quality, I first need to determine how to identify and measure each construct.  
In the first section (Section 3.2.1), I specify the different measurements of audit 
committee multiple directorships (AC-MD) that I use. In the next section (Section 3.2.2), 
I construct the measurement for financial experts. In the following section (Section 
3.2.3), I examine different approaches to measure financial reporting quality.  Finally (in 
Section 3.2.4), I build the models to test the hypotheses derived above. 
3.2.1 Measures of “Multiple directorships” (MD)  
Developing appropriate measurements of MD is a crucial issue in this study.  This 
study measures MD at both individual (each audit committee member) level and 
committee level.  As discussed earlier, this alleviates the problems of prior research (e.g., 
Ferris et al. 2003, Yang and Krishnan 2005, Carcello and Neal 2003) which uses the 
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average number of directorships to depict MD at the board level.  At the individual audit 
committee member level, I initially use three directorships as a threshold to separate High 
MD from Low MD audit committee members. There are three reasons for choosing three 
directorships as a threshold. First, the average number of directorships in my sample is 
close to three. Therefore, three directorships provide a natural cut-off for separating high-
MD and low-MD firms.  Second, the Council of Institutional Investors has suggested that 
three directorships is a threshold for distinguishing high directorships. Third, three 
directorships is a common threshold adopted in prior literature. I later examine the 
sensitivity of my findings to selection of this cutoff point. 
At the committee level, I code a binary variable (HMD_AC) as one if a majority 
of the audit committee members (more than 50%) have high MD since the majority rule 
dominates committee actions (Klein 2002a).  
3.2.2 Identification of financial experts 
The SEC’s current definition of a “financial expert” is broadly conceived to 
include accounting experts (e.g., CFOs, chief controllers and others with prior accounting 
experience) and non-accounting experts (which include financial analysis experts, such as 
investment bankers and private investors, and supervisory experts, such as presidents and 
CEOs).  Recent research has examined the effect of having a financial expert who is also 
an accounting expert. DeFond et al. (2005) find that the market reacts positively to the 
appointment of an accounting expert but has no reaction to the appointment of a non-
accounting financial expert. This finding suggests that accounting expertise rather than 
broader financial expertise is perceived to improve the audit committee’s effectiveness. 
However, DeFond et al. (2005) don’t further break down the non-accounting experts into 
financial analysis experts and supervisory experts. Carcello et al. (2006) split non-
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accounting financial experts into two groups, “senior business executives” and “other 
non-accounting experts”, and  find a negative relation between “other non-accounting 
experts” (mostly are financial analysis experts) and earnings management, suggesting 
that besides accounting experts,  financial analysis experts are also beneficial to audit 
committee effectiveness.  Therefore, in this study, I define financial experts as accounting 
experts plus financial analysis experts.  Later on in my sensitivity tests part, I also use 
alternative measure of financial experts.  
3.2.3 Measures of earnings quality 
Since the main responsibility of the audit committee is to oversee the firm’s 
financial reporting quality, I use earnings quality as a proxy for audit committee 
effectiveness.  This paper adopts three commonly used proxies for earnings quality: 
abnormal accruals, accounting restatements and earning informativeness.  
The first measure is abnormal accruals. Prior literature documents various 
methods to estimate abnormal accruals. In this study, I choose the performance adjusted 
modified Jones model (see Kothari et al. 2005; Francis  et al. 2005a) since  Kothari et al. 
(2005) provide evidence that  performance-matched abnormal accrual measures have 
smaller error rates than Jones model and modified Jones model abnormal accruals.  
I begin to compute the expected accruals by estimating the following equation for 
each industry-year (SIC two digits, conditional on having at least 20 firm-years) using all 
firms in Compustat.  
TAit = β0 (1/ Assetsi,t-1) + β1 (ΔSalesit - ΔARit) + β2 PPEit + εit  
Where: TAit =net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #123)-operational cash 
flow (Compustat #308)  
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Assetsi,t-1 =firm i’s total assets (Compustat #6) in year t-1 
∆Salesit = change in firm i’s sales (Compustat #12) from year t-1 to t, scaled by 
assets at the beginning  of year t  
∆ARit = change in firm i’s accounts receivable from operating activities 
(Compustat #302) from year t-1 to t, scaled by assets at the beginning  of 
year t 
PPEit = firm i’s gross property, plant, and equipment (Compustat #7) in year t, 
scaled by assets at the beginning  of year t . 
Abnormal accruals (DA) are the residual values from the above equation. 
Consistent with Kothari et al (2005), I partition the sample firms in each two-digits SIC 
code industry into deciles based on the firm’s lagged return on assets (ROA) defined as 
net income before extraordinary items divided by beginning of year total assets. 
Performance-adjusted accruals (PMDA) are calculated as the difference between firm i’s 
unadjusted abnormal accrual and the median abnormal accrual for its industry ROA 
decile, where the median calculation excludes firm i (Francis et al. 2005a).  
The second measure is the incidence of accounting restatements, which is 
sometimes used as another proxy for financial reporting quality.  I use an indicator 
variable (RES) to identify firm years in which there have been restatements due to GAAP 
violations.  Restatements that are triggered by changes in accounting principles are not 
included in this measure.    
The third measure is earnings informativeness. Earnings informativeness has been 
widely used as a market measure of earnings quality (e.g., Francis et al. 2005b and Wang 
2006). Greater earnings informativeness generally implies higher quality earnings.  
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Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Easton and Harris 1991,  Francis et al. 2005b, Cohen 
et al. 2006), I test the significance of both the level of, and the change in earnings related 
to stock returns. More details of these models and their applications to my study will be 
discussed in Section 3.2.4. 
3.2.4 Empirical models 
 I now describe the empirical models that I use to examine the hypotheses I 
derived in Section 3.1. 
3.2.4.1 Overall Effects - Test of H1: The effect of AC-MD on financial reporting quality 
3.2.4.1.1 Abnormal accruals models  
To examine the effect of AC-MD on financial reporting quality (H1), I first use 
models that regress absolute value of abnormal accrual on AC-MD. Specifically, I use the 
following models. 
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Where: 
LOG_ABS_PMDA is the natural log of the absolute value of performance matched 
abnormal accruals measured as abnormal accrual minus the median abnormal accrual  for 
a portfolio of firms (with the same 2- digit SIC code Year) in the same ROA decile . 
 
HMD-AC is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the audit committee is 
classified as high-MD and 0 otherwise. 
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HMD_CHAIR is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the audit committee chair 
has greater than or equal to three directorships and zero otherwise. 
 
HMD_FE. is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if all audit committee financial 
experts in a firm have greater than or equal to three directorships and zero otherwise. 
 
BD_IND is the percentage of independent board members. 
 
CEO_TENURE is the number of years the current CEO has been in the position. 
 
MGMT_HOLD is the percentage of common equity owned by the CEO. 
 
MV/BV is the market value of the firm over book value of assets, measured at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. 
 
Neg_NI is an indicator variable of one if the firm has had two or more consecutive years 
of negative income, ending on the fiscal year prior to the shareholders’ meeting. 
 
Abs_NICHANGE is the absolute value of the change in net income between the previous 
year and current year (deflated by last year’s assets) 
 
LEV is the long-term debt divided by last year’s assets. 
 
LOG_ASSETS is the natural log of the total assets. 
 
 
Consistent with prior literature ( e.g.,  DeFond and Park 1997),  I use the absolute 
value of the performance-adjusted abnormal accruals (ABS_PADA) as a proxy for both 
income increasing and income decreasing abnormal accruals. Also, I use the natural log 
of ABS_PMDA to address the non-normality issue related to ABS_PMDA. 
In each model (1a-1c), I am interested in examining the significance and sign of  
ß1. If MD of the whole audit committee or MD of audit committee focal points is 
positively associated with financial reporting quality, I expect to see a negative ß1, and 
vice versa.  
Since audit committee effectiveness is deemed to be affected by the whole board 
(Klein 2002a), board independence (BD_IND), measured as the percentage of 
independent board directors is also controlled for.  Since AC_IND and BD_IND are 
highly correlated, I only control for BD_IND. In addition, I use CEO_TENURE to 
control the power and influence of CEO. Consistent with Klein (2002a), I also control for 
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CEO shareholding (MGMT_HOLD), firm growth (MV/BV), total debt (LEV) and firm 
size (LOG_ASSETS).5   
3.2.4.1.2 Accounting restatements models  
To examine the effect of AC-MD on financial reporting quality (H1), I also use 
logistic models that regress the incidence of accounting restatements (RES) on AC-MD. 
Specifically, I use the following models. 
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Where RES is the incidence of accounting restatement, coded as one if current year’s 
final statements need to be restated and zero otherwise. All other variables are as defined 
in model 1. 
In each model (2a-2c), I am interested in examining the significance and sign of  
ß1. If MD of the whole audit committee or MD of audit committee focal points is 
positively associated with financial reporting quality, I expect to see a negative ß1, and 
vice versa.  
3.2.4.1.3 Earnings informativeness models 
                                                 
5 Previous studies suggest that financial leverage and political costs (proxied by firm size) affect earnings 
management (see Warfield et al., 1995; Dechow et al., 1995; Bartov et al., 2000). 
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As discussed in section 3.2.3, another proxy I use for financial reporting quality is 
the earnings informativeness.   Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Easton and Harris 
1991,  Francis et al. 2005b, Cohen et al. 2006), I estimate earnings informativeness by 
considering  both the level of, and change in earnings. Specifically, I use the following 
models. 
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Where: 
 
RET is firm i’s 12-month cumulative raw return for fiscal year t. The 12-month interval 
starts three months following the end of the fiscal year t-1 and ends three months after the 
end of fiscal year t. 
 
NI is firm i’s annual earnings (before extraordinary items) for fiscal year t, scaled by 
market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t-1. 
 
CHANGNI is the change in NI between year t-1 and year t, scaled by market value of 
equity at the end of fiscal year t-1. 
 
Xk are the following four control variables: 
MV/BV, LEV, LOSS, LOG_ASSETS. 
 
LOSS takes the value of one if NI<0 and zero otherwise.  
 
All other variables are as defined in model 1. 
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In each models (3a-3c), I am interested in examining the significance and sign of  
(ß2+ ß4 ). Under the null hypothesis H1, ß2 + ß4 =0; greater earnings informativeness 
implies ß2 + ß4 >0 and vice versa.  
3.2.4.2 Test of H2: The effect of SOX on AC-MD  
To examine the effect of SOX on the incidence of AC- MD (H2), I use logistic 
models which regress dichotomous variables: HMD_AC or HMD (CHAIR) or HMD 
(FE) on SOX. Specifically, I use the following logistic models. 
aitASSETSLOGNINEGBVMVitSOXitACHMD 4_4_3/210_ εβββββ +++++=  
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Where: 
 
HMD_AC takes value one if whole audit committee has high MD and zero otherwise.  
 
HMD (Chair) takes value of one if an individual audit committee chair has high multiple 
directorships and zero otherwise. 
 
HMD (FE)  takes value one if an individual audit committee financial expert has high 
multiple directorships and  zero otherwise. 
 
SOX takes on the value of one after year 2002 and zero otherwise.  
 
CEO takes on the value of one if the audit chair or audit financial expert’s primary title is 
CEO and zero otherwise. 
 
RETIRE takes on the value of one if the audit chair or audit financial expert is retired and 
zero otherwise. 
 
All other variables are as defined in model 1. 
The independent variable of interest is SOX. Each model (4a-4c) is director fixed 
effects model. In addition, to control for other confounding variables, for model 4a, I 
control the firm growth (MV/BV), financial stress (NEG_NI) and firm size 
(LOG_ASSETS) because firms with high growth and large size might be more attractive 
to high quality directors and firms in financial stress might lose high quality directors.  
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For model 4b and 4c, I control the possible timeline effect (e.g., as time goes by, directors 
age, get retired or obtain more experience and get promoted), which might naturally 
decrease or increase their attractiveness as members of boards, resulting in a decrease or 
increase in multiple directorships. For example, Perry and Peyer (2005) find that retired 
CEOs tend to have fewer directorships.  Fich and White (2005) find that CEOs are more 
likely to acquire directorships.  Since this kind of change of MD is not necessarily related 
to SOX, I control for (1) whether or not the committee member is a CEO, and (2) 
whether or not the committee member is retired to incorporate the time line effect.  
3.2.4.3  Test of H3: The effect of SOX on the relation between AC-MD and financial 
reporting quality. 
To examine the effect of SOX on the relation between AC-MD and financial 
reporting quality, I only use two proxies for financial reporting quality: abnormal 
accruals and earnings informativeness. The reason to drop accounting restatements in this 
test is  because my accounting restatements sample6 only covers year 2001 to 2005,  a 
sample period not appropriate for a SOX effects test considering that both year 2001 and 
2002 might not be a clean setting for Pre-SOX.    
3.2.4.3.1 Abnormal accruals models 
I  use models which regress absolute value of abnormal accruals on the  
interaction terms, SOX*HMD_AC, SOX*HMD_CHAIR and SOX*HMD_FE. 
Specifically, to test H3 (the effect of SOX on the relation between MD of whole audit 
committee and financial reporting quality), I use the following models. 
                                                 
6 My accounting restatements data is from Audit Analytic database, in which restatement data is available 
starting from year 2001.  
  
38  
aASSETSLogLEV
NICHANGEAbsNINEGBVMVHOLDMGMTTENURECEO
INDBDACHMDSOXSOXACHMDPMDAABSLOG
ititit
ititit
itititit
5_
__/__
__*___
1110
98765
43210
εββ
βββββ
βββββ
+++
+++++
++++=
 
 
bASSETSLogLEV
NICHANGEABSNINEGBVMVHOLDMGMTTENURECEO
INDBDCHAIRHMDSOXSOXCHAIRHMDPMDAABSLOG
ititit
ititit
itititit
5_
__/__
__*___
1110
98765
43210
εββ
βββββ
βββββ
+++
+++++
++++=
 
 
cASSETSLogLEV
NICHANGEABSNINEGBVMVHOLDMGMTTENURECEO
INDBDFEHMDSOXSOXFEHMDPMDAABSLOG
ititit
ititit
itititit
5_
__/__
__*___
1110
98765
43210
εββ
βββββ
βββββ
+++
+++++
++++=
 
The above models (5a-5c) are very similar to the previous models1a-1c (used to test H1) 
in section 3.2.4.1.1 respectively. The only difference is that these three models add the 
interaction term: SOX*HMD_AC, SOX*HMD_CHAIR or SOX*HMD_FE. The 
definition and measurement of all variables are exactly the same as previously described. 
The independent variables of interest are the three interaction terms: 
SOX*HMD_AC, SOX*HMD_CHAIR or SOX*HMD_FE. For example, if  audit 
committee FE multiple directorships (HMD_FE) is more positively (or less negatively) 
associated with financial reporting quality post-SOX compared to the pre-SOX era, I 
expect to see a significantly negative ß3 and the estimate of  joint test on 
HMD_FE+SOX*HMD_FE=0, and vice versa.   
3.2.4.3.2 Earnings informativeness models 
I  use models which regress one year stock raw return (RET) on  the  interaction 
terms: SOX*NI*HMD_AC, SOX*CHANGNI*HMD_AC, SOX*NI*HMD_CHAIR , 
SOX*CHANGNI*HMD_CHAIR,  SOX*NI*HMD_FE and 
SOX*CHANGNI*HMD_FE. Specifically, to test H3 (the effect of SOX on the relation 
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between MD of whole audit committee and financial reporting quality), I use the 
following models. 
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The above models (6a-6c) are very similar to the previous models 3a-3c (used to test H1) 
in section 3.2.4.1.3 respectively. The only difference is that these three models add the 
interaction terms with SOX, such as SOX*NI*HMD_AC. The definition and 
measurement of all variables are exactly the same as previously described. 
To test the SOX effects, I will compare the difference between two joint tests: one 
without SOX term and one with SOX term. For example, if  audit committee FE multiple 
directorships (HMD_FE) affects earnings informativeness only in pre-SOX, I expect to 
see the  joint test NI*HMD_FE+CHANGNI*HMD_FE significantly different from zero 
and the joint test NI*HMD_FE+SOX*NI*HMD_FE+CHANGNI*HMD_FE+ 
SOX*CHANGNI*HMD_FE not significantly different from zero.     
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 CHAPTER 4:   EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This chapter details the sample selection process, describes my data and provides 
an empirical assessment of hypotheses using models as discussed in Chapter 3.  Section 
4.1 specifies my sample selection procedure.  In Section 4.2, I provide descriptive 
statistics on multiple directorships, financial reporting quality and other control variables.  
In Section 4.3, I describe the multivariate tests results. Section 4.4 presents some 
supplementary tests results.  In Section 4.5, I detail all the robustness checks.    
4.1 Sample selection 
My primary sample consists of all S&P 500 firms that appear in the RiskMetrics’ 
directors database7 from 1997 to 2005.  I choose this sample period to take advantage of 
the availability of the RiskMetrics database.  This database contains corporate 
governance information on company directors such as committee membership, 
independence, qualifications, work experience, tenure and other such data.  In addition, I 
use the Executive Compensation (EXECUCOMP) database to gather data on CEO tenure 
and CEO ownership.  I also hand gather, directly from proxy statements, data relating to 
financial experts and audit committee chairs that are missing from the RiskMetrics 
database.  I also collect data on audit committee meeting frequency from proxy 
statements.  Table 1 Panel A describes how my final sample is determined.  First, 
consistent with prior research (e.g., Klein 2002a), I exclude 588 firm years relating to 
financial institutions (SIC codes: 6000-6999) and 36 firm years representing foreign 
firms (FINC variable in COMPUSTAT not equal to zero).  Financial institutions are 
typically excluded because they are regulated firms which have accounting incentives 
                                                 
7 This database was formerly known as the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) database. 
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and accrual processes that make them different from nonfinancial firms.  Then, 268 firm-
year observations are eliminated due to missing information in the RISKMETRICS 
database.  I also eliminate another 439 firm-year observations because of missing data in 
EXECUCOMP (364) or in Compustat (75).  My final sample size is thus 3,169 firm-year 
observations relating to 11,516 director-years, 544 unique companies and 3,065 unique 
directors. Table 1 Panel B provides the distribution of my final sample by year and 
industry. The number of firms across my sample years is somewhat uniform, indicating 
that no firm year is either dominant or under-represented in my sample.  Over one half of 
observations relate to manufacturing firms, with the remainder largely in services, trade 
and communication industries.   
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
For some empirical tests, such as the tests related to audit committee financial 
experts and audit committee chairs, I will use sub-samples consisting of fewer firm years. 
For example, the sub-sample used to examine multiple directorships of audit committee 
chairs includes only 2,690 firm-years.  The reason for the lower sample size in this 
instance is that data on audit committee chairs are not available in some proxy 
statements. In addition, the sub-sample related to financial experts includes only the 
2,1768 firm-years which have at least one financial expert. 
In assigning observations to specific firm years, I take into account the fact that 
the “year” variable in the RISKMETRICS database indicates the calendar year in which 
the annual meeting is held, which relates to the fiscal year that has most recently ended.   
                                                 
8 This number is based on the narrow definition of the financial experts. As described in chapter 3, 
Financial expert here refers to SEC’s initial narrow definition, plus certain people with financial analysis 
expertise but without direct accounting experience, such as private investors 
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I also carefully consider the different year convention that Compustat follows9, in 
assigning observations to specific firm years.  In sum, I ensure that my data reflects the 
composition of boards and audit committees, and other accounting and non-accounting 
variables as they are aligned with specific fiscal years.     
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 defines the major variables in this study and describes how they are 
measured.  Descriptive statistics for multiple directorships (MD) and other board and 
audit committee characteristics are presented in Table 3 Panel A. For all years examined, 
the average number of directorships per director at the board level is 2.277, compared to 
a slightly higher 2.346 at the audit committee level. In addition, 27 percent of audit 
committees are high-MD (HMD_AC) according to the initial classification10 that I use. 
About 69%11 of all firm-years have at least one financial expert.  Among all 2,176 firm-
years which have at least one financial expert, about 30 percent of firm-years have high-
MD financial experts. Furthermore, among the sub-sample of 2,690 observations for 
which data on audit committee chairs is available, 41.4 percent of audit committees have 
a high-MD audit committee chair. In addition, on average, audit committees meet around 
5 to 6 time a year and approximately 27 percent firm-years’ audit committee chairs are 
also financial experts.   
                                                 
9 In the Compustat database, fiscal years are assigned to the current calendar year if they end during the last 
seven months of the year and to the prior calendar years otherwise.  For instance, if the fiscal year of a firm 
ends between January 1, 2006 and May 31, 2006, the firm year is assigned to fiscal year 2005 by 
Compustate; if the fiscal year ends between June 1, 2006 and December 31, 2006, the corresponding firm 
year is assigned to 2006.    
10 As described in chapter 3, I take two steps to classify high MD audit committee. Firstly, I use three 
directorships as a threshold to separate High MD from Low MD AC members; then I code a binary 
variable (HMD-AC) as one if a majority of the AC members (more than 50%) have high MD. 
11 Computed by taking the FE sub sample size: 2,176 divided by full sample size:3,169.   
  
43  
Table 3 Panel B presents univariate tests for differences in means and medians 
between pre SOX12 and post SOX for measures of board related variables. While HMD-
AC significantly decreased post-SOX (from 0.30 to 0.234; p value <0.01), the incidence 
of audit committees with HMD-CHAIR or HMD_FE has not changed significantly. Also, 
audit committee members meet significantly more often (p value <0.01) post SOX (7 to 8 
times) compared to pre SOX (4 to 5 times), suggesting that multiple directorships 
significantly increases time commitment post SOX.  Furthermore, post SOX, more firm-
years’ audit committee chairs are also financial experts.  In addition, board size, total 
board multiple directorships, audit committee size, total audit committee multiple 
directorships, and average audit committee multiple directorships, significantly decreased 
post-SOX.  
[Insert Table 2 & Table 3 about here] 
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for individual audit committee members. 
Table 4, Panel A presents data on the full sample. According to Panel A, each audit 
committee member has a mean of 2.24 directorships, with median of 2.   Additionally, 
some interesting observations include the findings that around 15% of the audit 
committee members are female, 20% are current CEOs and 18% are retired. Table 4 
Panel A also presents univariate tests for differences in means and medians between pre 
SOX and post SOX observations for variables related to individual audit committee 
members. While the mean number of directorships significantly decreases (from 2.26 to 
2.19) post SOX, the median does not significantly change, suggesting that audit 
committee members with a very high level of directorships pre SOX have decreased their 
directorships post SOX. In addition, while both the mean and median percentage of AC 
                                                 
12 As described in chapter 3, I code SOX as one for year after 2002 and zero otherwise. 
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members who are also CEOs significantly decrease post SOX, the mean and median 
percentage of AC members who are retired significantly increase, suggesting that SOX 
has increased the risk and workload of directors, resulting in fewer sitting executives 
serving as directors. This result is consistent with Bebchuk et al. (2006) and Linck et al. 
(2008).  
Table 4 Panel B and Panel C provide descriptive data for audit committee chairs 
and financial experts respectively.   They show that, on average, audit commit chairs 
have higher numbers of directorships than financial experts. Also, on average, audit 
commit chairs reduce the number of directorships post-SOX while financial experts 
increase the number of directorships post-SOX, although these differences are not 
statistically significant.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for firm characteristics for all sample firm-
years.  The average CEO tenure is 6 years and most of the CEOs have a very small 
percentage ownership (the upper quartile is 0.4%) in the company. Regarding accounting 
variables, the average absolute performance matched discretionary accrual is 4.8% of 
previous years’ total assets; about 19% observations had accounting restatements; the 
average market to book ratio is 4.51; around 12% of our observations have two or more 
years of consecutive losses; and the average long term debt is 23% of the previous years’ 
total assets.      
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
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Table 6 documents the potential association between major test variables and 
financial reporting quality (proxied for by ABS_PMDA).  The correlation13 between 
HMD_AC and ABS_PMDA is negative but not significant. The correlation between 
HMD_CHAIR and ABS_PMDA is negative and significant.(p-value <0.01). In addition, 
the correlation between HMD_FE and ABS_PMDA is also negative and significant. (p-
value <0.01).  While board independence (BD_IND) has a significantly negative 
correlation with ABS_PMDA, there is no significant correlation between audit committee 
independence (AC_IND) and ABS_PMDA, which might be due to the insufficient 
variation of the audit committee independence as a result of the regulation change 
requiring all audit committee members to be independent.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
4.3 Multivariate tests results 
In this section, I present multivariate tests results. I first examine H1, which is my 
hypotheses on the overall relationship between multiple directorships and financial 
reporting quality.  As discussed in Section 3.2.4 of Chapter 3, there are three proxies for 
financial reporting quality: performance matched abnormal accruals, accounting 
restatement and earnings informativeness.  
Table 7 Panel A provides the results of tests of the association between AC-MD 
and abnormal accruals.  The dependent variable (Log_ABS_PMDA) is the natural log of 
absolute value of performance matched abnormal accruals. I use this measure based on 
Kothari et al. (2005) and because it has been commonly used in prior studies (e.g., 
Francis et al. 2005a, Carcello et al. 2007) as a proxy for financial reporting quality.   
                                                 
13 Here I refer to Spearman correlation because it requires weaker assumptions.  
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Model 1a (relating to H1a), Model 1b (relating to H1b) and Model 1c (relating to 
H1c) test the association between Log_ABS_PMDA and three major test variables: 
HMD_AC, HMD_CHAIR, HMD_FE respectively. According to Table 7 Panel A, there 
is no significant relationship between HMD_AC and Log_ABS_PMDA taking my 
sample period as a whole. The association between HMD_CHAIR and 
Log_ABS_PMDA is negative and significant (p-value < 0.05).  The association between 
HMD_FE and Log_ABS_PMDA is also negative and significant (p-value<0.05). These 
results indicate that firms with higher MD audit committee chair or higher MD financial 
experts tend to have higher financial reporting quality.  I interpret these results to indicate 
that multiple directorships of audit committee chairs and financial experts are a signal of 
monitoring effectiveness as the reputation effects of multiple directorships outweigh the 
costs of multiple directorships in terms of time commitment. 
With respect to control variables which are significant in my model the signs of 
their coefficients are consistent with my predictions as described in Section 3.2.4 of 
Chapter 3. For example, as in Klein (2002a), I obtain a significantly positive association 
between firm growth, the change of net income and abnormal accruals and a significantly 
negatively association between firm size and abnormal accruals. However, I find a 
significantly negative relation between LEV (firm leverage) and abnormal accrual even 
though the coefficient of LEV is predicted to be positive.  The prediction is based on the 
argument that a firm with a higher leverage has more incentive to manipulate earnings to 
satisfy contracts with debtholders.  My finding, however, is not inconsistent with the 
literature.  Wang (2006),  Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002) and Cheng and Warfield 
(2005) also document a significantly negative relation between leverage and abnormal 
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accruals. One explanation for this finding is that a firm with a higher leverage is likely to 
have more monitoring from the debtor.  
Table 7 Panel B examines H1 by considering another proxy for financial reporting 
quality, namely accounting restatements.  It presents results of tests of the association 
between AC-MD and the incidence of accounting restatements.  The dependent variable 
(RES) is an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the current year’s final 
statements need to be restated and zero otherwise. In constructing the RES variable, I 
exclude restatements that are due to factors other than accounting errors or misstatements 
– for instance restatements due to accounting changes.  My variable therefore more 
closely captures cross-sectional variation in financial reporting quality.  Model 2a 
(relating to H1a), Model 2b (relating to H1b) and Model 2c (relating to H1c) test the 
association between RES and three major test variables: HMD_AC, HMD_CHAIR, 
HMD_FE respectively. According to Table 7 Panel B, there is a negative relationship 
between HMD_AC and RES although it is only marginally significant (p-value<0.1).  
This result departs from the pervious results in Table 7 Panel A, in which I find no 
significant relationship between HMD_AC and absolute abnormal accruals.  Later on, in 
supplementary tests (reported in Table 10), I will further explore this inconsistency.  The 
association between HMD_CHAIR and RES is negative and significant (p-value<0.01). 
The association between HMD_FE and RES is also negative and significant (p-
value<0.05). These results indicate that firms with higher MD audit committee chair or 
higher MD financial experts tend to have higher financial reporting quality, which is 
consistent with what I find in Table 7 when I use abnormal accrual as a proxy for 
financial reporting quality.  The signs of most significant control variables are consistent 
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with my predictions as described in Section 3.2.4 of Chapter 3. For example, as in Abbott 
et al. (2004), I obtain significantly positive associations between measures of firm finance 
stress (NEG_NI), and change of net income (ABS_NICHANGE) and the incidence of 
accounting restatements (RES). However, the coefficients on firm growth (MV/BV) and 
firm size (LOG_ASSETS) are in the opposite direction to my predictions. Firm size is 
predicted to be negatively associated with accounting restatements based on the argument 
that bigger firms tend to have better financial reporting quality. However, I find a positive 
association between LOG_ASSETS and RES. One possible explanation is that bigger 
firms are more likely to get caught for accounting irregularities or errors because of the 
higher scrutiny that they are likely to face. Similarly, firm growth is predicted to be 
positively associated with accounting restatements based on the argument that firms with 
high growth tend to manipulate earnings to meet expectations.  However, I find a 
negative  association between MV/BV and RES.  
Finally, I re-examine H1 using a third proxy for financial reporting quality – 
earnings informativeness.  Table 7 Panel C provides results of tests of the association 
between AC-MD and earnings informativeness.   The dependent variable (RET) is firm 
i’s 12 month (starting from the 3 month after the end of fiscal year t-1) cumulative raw 
return for fiscal year t. Model 3a (relating to H1a), Model 3b (relating to H1b) and Model 
3c (relating to H1c) test the association between earnings informativeness and three 
major test variables: HMD_AC, HMD_CHAIR, HMD_FE respectively. According to 
Table 7 Panel C, the joint test NI*HMD_AC+CHANGNI*HMD_AC is not significant 
from zero, suggesting that there is no significant association between HMD_AC and 
earnings informativeness. While the joint test of 
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NI*HMD_CHAIR+CHANGNI*HMD_CHAIR is significantly less than zero,  the joint 
test of NI*HMD_FE +CHANGNI*HMD_FE is significantly greater than zero,  
indicating that HMD_CHAIR reduces earnings informativeness but HMD_FE increases 
earnings informativenss. One explanation might be that investors perceive that the cost of 
multiple directorships of audit committee chairs is greater than the benefit of expanded 
expertise, because audit committee chairs are heavily involved with the administration 
(such as set up agenda) of the audit committee. For HMD_FE, investors might perceive 
that the benefit of MD is greater than its cost because financial experts are more focused 
on the transfer of knowledge and skills across firms.  All significant control variables are 
consistent with my predictions as described in Section 3.2.6 of Chapter 3. For example, 
consistent with prior literature (Fan and Wong 2002, Francis et al. 2005b), I obtain a 
significantly positive association between firm growth and earnings informativeness.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
In Chapter 3, I do not make directional predictions for the relationship between 
multiple directorships and financial reporting quality (H1) because existing theories (the 
agency theory and the labor market theory) predict that there are both costs and benefits 
associated with audit committee multiple directorships: Agency theory predicts that audit 
committees with high multiple directorships might be subject to time constraints, which 
impinges upon monitoring effectiveness and adversely affects financial reporting quality.  
In contrast, labor market theory implies that audit committees (or audit committee 
members) with high multiple directorships might work more diligently because of their 
stake in their reputational capital, and might transfer their knowledge and experience 
across firms. As a result, high audit committees multiple directorships might be beneficial 
to financial reporting quality. Overall, the results in Tables 7 indicate that for audit 
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committee focal points (CHAIR and FE), the benefit of multiple directorships is greater 
than the cost.  I do not however find a significant relationship between multiple 
directorships of the audit committee as a whole and financial reporting quality.  I 
examine this issue in greater detail when I consider the possibility that SOX has changed 
the relationship between multiple directorships and financial reporting quality, possibly 
resulting in no observed effect for a sample that encompasses both the pre SOX and post 
SOX periods. 
I next examine H2 – i.e., whether SOX has significantly changed the incidence of 
multiple directorships among audit committees as a whole as well as among focal 
members like audit committee chairs and financial experts.  The corresponding results are 
presented in Table 8. Model 4a (relating to H2a), Model 4b (relating to H2b) and Model 
4c (relating to H2c) test the effects of SOX on HMD_AC, HMD (CHAIR), HMD (FE) 
respectively. According to this table, the incidence of high multiple directorships at the 
audit committee level is lower post-SOX, which is against H2a. However, both an audit 
committee chair and a financial expert are more likely to have higher levels of multiple 
directorships post SOX than pre SOX, which supports H2b and H2c.  Overall, the results 
is consistent with the greater emphasis on improving the quality of audit committees post 
SOX.  In examining the control variables, I find that CEOs are more likely to have high 
multiple directorships and retired people are less likely to have high multiple 
directorships post-SOX, which is consistent with the literature (Peyer 2005, Fich and 
White 2005). 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
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Finally, I empirically evaluate H3a, H3b and H3c as discussed in Chapter 3, 
investigating whether SOX has changed the association between multiple directorships 
and financial reporting quality.  The related results are presented in Table 9.  As 
discussed in Section 3.2.4 of Chapter 3, there are two proxies for financial reporting 
quality in this test: abnormal accruals and earnings informativeness.  
Table 9 Panel A uses abnormal accruals as the proxy for financial reporting 
quality. The dependent variable is, as with H1, Log_ABS_PMDA, which is the natural 
log of the absolute value of performance matched abnormal accruals. Model 5a (relating 
to H3a), Model 5b (relating to H3b) and Model 5c (relating to H3c) test the effect of SOX 
on the association between Log_ABS_PMDA and three major test variables: HMD_AC, 
HMD_CHAIR, HMD_FE respectively. According to Table 9 Panel A, the coefficient on 
SOX is negative in all three models, which, consistent with Cohen et al. (2006), suggests 
that SOX has generally resulted in lower earnings management. In Model 5a, HMD_AC 
is insignificant, but the interaction term,   SOX*HMD_AC is positively significant (p-
value<0.05) and the joint test HMD_AC+HMD_AC*SOX is also positively significant 
(p-value<0.10), suggesting that the relationship between HMD_AC and financial 
reporting quality became more negative after SOX.  For the audit committee taken as a 
whole, my results are consistent with the costs of multiple directorship outweighing 
benefits post SOX, in contrast to the pre SOX era.  This finding could explain whey I find 
no significant association between HMD_AC and financial reporting quality when I 
consider the entire sample period.   In both Models 5b and 5c, the coefficients on 
HMD_CHAIR and HMD_FE are negative and significant. However, the two interaction 
terms SOX*HMD_CHAIR and SOX*HMD_FE are significant, suggesting that both 
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HMD_CHAIR and HMD_FE affect financial reporting quality differently post-SOX 
compared to pre-SOX.  In addition, the two joint tests of 
HMD_CHAIR+HMD_CHAIR*SOX and HMD_FE+HMD_FE*SOX are not 
significantly different from zero, indicating that the positive relationship between 
HMD_CHAIR, HMD_FE and financial reporting quality is driven largely by the pre-
SOX observations.  
Table 9 Panel B uses earnings informativeness as the proxy for financial reporting 
quality. The dependent variable is RET, which is  firm i’s one year raw return. Model 6a 
(relating to H3a), Model 6b (relating to H3b) and Model 6c (relating to H3c) test the 
effect of SOX on the association between RET and three major test variables: HMD_AC, 
HMD_CHAIR, HMD_FE respectively. According to Table 9 Panel B, the joint test of 
NI*HMD_AC+CHANGNI*HMD_AC is not significantly  different from zero, but the 
joint test of 
NI*HMD_AC+SOX*NI*HMD_AC+CHANGNI*HMD_AC+SOX*NI*HMD_AC is 
significantly less than zero, suggesting that HMD_AC decreases earnings 
informativeness post-SOX. For HMD_CHAIR, both the joint test of 
NI*HMD_CHAIR+CHANGNI*HMD_CHAIR and that of 
NI*HMD_CHAIR+SOX*NI*HMD_CHAIR+CHANGNI*HMD_CHAIR+SOX*NI*HM
D_CHAIR are significantly less than zero, suggesting that HMD_CHAIR decreases 
earnings informativeness in both pre-SOX and post-SOX. However, for HMD_FE, the 
joint test of NI*HMD_AC+CHANGNI*HMD_AC is significantly greater than zero, but 
the joint test of 
NI*HMD_AC+SOX*NI*HMD_AC+CHANGNI*HMD_AC+SOX*NI*HMD_AC is not 
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significantly different from zero, suggesting that the positive relationship between 
HMD_FE and financial reporting quality (found in earlier test of H1) is driven largely by 
the pre-SOX observations.  
 Taken together, the results in Table 9 suggest that costs of multiple directorships 
provide a more dominant effect post-SOX. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
4.4 Supplementary tests  
To further analyze the results I find in section 4.3, I conduct several 
supplementary tests, the results of which are reported in this section.  
In previous tests, I use an indicator variable (HMD_AC) to measure multiple 
directorships at the audit committee level. In my first supplementary test, I use a 
continuous variable HMD_AC_PER (Percentage of AC Members with High-MD) to 
measure multiple directorships. This test is intended to examine if there is an inversed U-
Shape relation between HMD_AC_PER and FRQ.  Such a relationship would indicate 
that multiple directorships might be good to an extent beyond which the costs of multiple 
directorship potentially outweigh the benefits.  The test results are presented in Table 10. 
The dependent variable as before is the natural log of the absolute value of performance 
matched abnormal accruals (Log_ABS_PMDA). As we can observe from Table 10, the 
coefficients for both variables of interest, the percentage of AC members with high-MD,  
HMD_AC_PER and its  square term , HMD_AC_PER_SQR  are both statistically 
significant (p-value <0.05 and p-value<0.1 restively ); however, they have opposite signs 
(-0.451 and 0.479)indicating that there is an inverted U-shaped relation between multiple 
directorships magnitude and financial reporting quality.  This suggests that including 
members with high-MD in a committee is beneficial only to certain extent; beyond that 
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the costs of high multiple directorships outweigh the benefits, resulting in deterioration in 
financial reporting quality.   
To determine the kink point in the relationship between financial reporting quality 
and HMD_AC_PER (the optimal level), I use the first order condition (FOC) of the 
function [-0.451 HMD_AC_PER+0.479 (HMD_AC_PER)2].  Since the FOC is: -0.451 
+2*0.479 HMD_AC_PER=0, I solve to obtain the optimal HMD_AC_PER =0.4708.  
That is, on average, holding everything else constant, when the percentage of AC 
members with high MD is 47.08%, the abnormal accruals are at the lowest level, which, 
according to our proxy indicates the highest financial reporting quality.  
The results in Table 10 might also explain why I do not find a significant relation 
between HMD_AC and FRQ for the entire sample as reported in Table 7.  Since 
HMD_AC is an indicator that takes on a value of one when more than 50% of the audit 
members have high MD and zero otherwise, HMD_AC=1 means HMD_AC_PER>50% 
and HMD_AC=0 means HMD_AC_PER<50%. So, the non-linear relationship between 
HMD_AC_PER and FRQ indicates that high AC MD (HMD_AC=1) and low AC MD 
(HMD_AC=0) has no significant association with FRQ. The association depends on the 
density of the sample distribution of HMD_AC_PER. So, the SOX effect on HMD_AC 
and FRQ that I find in Table 9 Panel A might be a spurious relation.  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
My second supplemental test examines if my findings relating to the effect of 
HMD_CHAIR on FRQ are driven by the possibility that the audit committee chair is also 
a financial expert.  Accordingly CHAIR_FE is a variable that is coded as one if CHAIR 
and FE are the same person and zero otherwise.  Table 11 presents the test results after 
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controlling for CHAIR_FE. According to this table, the coefficient on HMD_CHAIR 
becomes insignificant but the joint test of HMD_CHAIR+HMD_CHAIR*CHAIR_FE is 
negative and significant, suggesting that the effect of HMD_CHAIR on FRQ is driven by 
observations with CHAIR_FE=1 (audit committee chair is also financial expert). 
Interestingly, the coefficient on CHAIR_FE is significantly positive, suggesting that a 
situation in which the audit committee chair is also the designated financial expert does 
not improve the monitoring effectiveness of the audit committee reflected in higher 
financial reporting quality.  All the results for other control variables are as before. 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
My third supplemental test examines whether the effect of HMD_CHAIR or 
HMD_FE on FRQ is conditioned on HMD_AC. Table 12 presents the test results. 
According to this table, the coefficient on HMD_CHAIR is significantly negative and the 
joint test HMD_CHAIR + HMD_CHAIR*HMD_AC is significantly less than zero, 
suggesting that the effect of HMD_CHAIR on FRQ is NOT conditioned on HMD_AC. In 
contrast, the coefficient on HMD_FE is significantly negative, but the joint test HMD_FE 
+ HMD_FE*HMD_AC is not significantly different from zero, suggesting that the effect 
of  HMD_FE on FRQ is mainly drive by observations with  low MD (HMD_AC=0). All 
the results for other control variables are as before. Since HMD_AC, HMD_CHAIR and 
HMD_FE are highly correlated (see table 6), I also examine the variance inflation factors 
or VIFs in the regression results. All the VIFs (unreported in the table) are well below 10, 
suggesting that multicollinearity does not significantly hamper interpretation of my 
results. 
 [Insert Table 12 about here] 
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My fourth supplemental test examines the SOX effect on the number of 
directorships of AC chairs and financial experts.  The rationale for this is that prior results 
examining the incidence of multiple directorships before and after SOX (as reported in 
Table 8) only tell us that AC chair and financial experts are more likely to have higher 
levels of multiple directorships post SOX compared to their pre SOX levels.   However, 
we do not know the details about the pattern of the change in the number of these 
directorships. There might be different scenarios associated with the previous results. 
One possibility is that AC chairs or financial experts largely increased the number of their 
directorships post SOX,  Another scenario that is also consistent with my results in Table 
8 is that directors with high MD pre SOX decreased their number of directorships post 
SOX, but not by enough to fall into the low_MD category.  A third possibility is that 
audit committee chairs and financial experts with low MD increased the number of their 
directorships to become high MD post SOX.  
Since the dependent variable (number of directorships) is ordinal, I use a Poisson 
Model to run the tests.  Table 13 presents the corresponding results. Panel A is for the full 
sample. According to panel A, the coefficient on SOX in model 1 (for audit committee 
chair) is insignificant, while the coefficient on SOX in model 2 (for audit committee 
financial experts) is significant positive, suggesting that in general only audit committee 
financial experts are more likely to acquire more directorships after SOX.  
In order to obtain deeper insights into these patterns, I perform subsample 
analyses.  I first construct the sub samples as follows.  First, for all audit committee chair-
years, I separate my observations into two groups: pre SOX and post SOX. Then I choose 
all chair-years with low MD from the pre SOX group and match them with the 
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observations in post SOX group by director ID.  I designate this group as low MD pre 
SOX.  Similarly, I choose all chair-years with high MD from the pre SOX group and 
match them with the observations in post SOX group by director ID. I designate this 
group as high MD pre SOX . Following the same methods, I construct two groups (FE 
low MD pre SOX and FE high MD pre SOX) for audit committee financial experts.  I 
then examine the pattern of increases and decreases in multiple directorships for these 
groups. 
Table 13 Panel B shows some interesting results. For both CHAIR and FE, the 
low MD pre SOX groups are more likely to increase their directorship post SOX, but the 
high MD pre SOX groups are more likely to decrease their directorships post SOX.  
 [Insert Table 13 about here] 
4.5 Robustness checks    
As discussed earlier, descriptive statistics in Table 3 indicate that NUM_DIR, the 
average directorships is between two and three. Initially, I use three directorships as a cut 
off number to distinguish between high and low MD.   An open question is whether there 
is some other number that would more appropriately mark the line between high and low 
multiple directorships, In order to examine whether my results are driven by my cut-off 
for multiple directorships, I perform robustness checks by using two directorships as a cut 
off number. The results are reported in Table 14 and shows results and conclusions that 
are similar to my primary analyses. 
[Insert Table 14 about here] 
I also examine whether my results are robust to alternate definitions of a financial 
expert.  I initially use the SEC’s narrow definition along with identifying people with 
financial analysis skills to define financial experts. Since the SEC’s final, broader 
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definition of a financial expert also includes people with supervisory expertise, such as 
the CEO or the COO, I conducted my second robustness check by including people with 
supervisory expertise as financial experts.  Table 15 presents the results of this robustness 
check. Although I find similar results regarding the effect of SOX on the incidence of 
HMD_FE, I do not find any significance  in the relation between HMD_FE and FRQ (for 
both the full sample as well as pre SOX and post SOX sub samples). The results suggest 
that the impact on financial reporting quality is driven by a stricter definition of a 
financial expert to only include audit committee members with direct accounting 
experience or financial analysis skills  which is consistent with findings in prior literature 
(e.g., Carcello  et al. 2007).  
[Insert Table 15 about here] 
I also perform a robustness check relating to my definition of pre SOX and post 
SOX periods.  I initially assign SOX a value of one for all firm-years after 2002 and zero 
otherwise. In order to avoid confounding effects of the year in which SOX was passed 
(i.e., the year 2002), I eliminate year 2002 observations entirely to see if the results still 
hold: i.e, pre-SOX = observations with fiscal year ending December 2001 or earlier; post-
SOX = observations with fiscal year ending January 2003 or later. The results (presented 
in Table 16) are similar to those that I find in my primary analyses. 
[Insert Table 16 about here] 
It is possible that multiple directorships after SOX has added costs compared to 
the pre SOX period.  One of costs of AC MD is that it potentially results in more time 
constraints for the director. This might be reflected, for instance, in audit committee 
meeting frequency. On the other hand, a larger audit committee might mitigate this kind 
of cost because of the potential for division of labor to handle committee responsibilities. 
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So, in my fourth robustness check, I include audit committee meeting frequency 
(AC_MEET) and audit committee size (AC_SIZE) as control variables. As Table 17 
shows, my results and conclusions are substantially unchanged. 
 [Insert Table 17 about here] 
As Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) point out, the endogeneity problem is common 
in research related to board composition. This research is no exception. While I examine 
whether financial reporting quality is affected by multiple directorships on audit 
committees, there may be reasons to believe that audit committee multiple directorship is 
affected by financial reporting quality. For example, a firm with deteriorating financial 
reporting quality might consider strengthening its board in general and its audit 
committee in particular. As a result, it might start to hire more high quality audit 
committee members, who tend to have higher numbers of directorships. Thus, my 
analysis suffers from a potential endogeneity issue. I address this self-selection or reverse 
causality problem using the Heckman (1979) two step treatment effects model14.  In the 
treatment effects model, I model HMD_AC or HMD_CHAIR or HMD_FE as an 
endogenous choice. Note that the first-stage probit models include the proxy for financial 
reporting quality (one year lag of the absolute value of performance matched 
discretionary accruals) and all other control variables (such as board independence, firm 
growth, firm size etc.) that also enter the second-stage (outcome) regressions. In the 
treatment (second-stage) regressions models, I use Inverse Mill's Ratios (calculated from 
the first-stage probit models) to proxy for HMD_AC, HMD_CHAIR and HMD_FE 
respectively.  In Table 18 Panel A, the first-stage regression shows that the incidence of 
                                                 
14I choose the Heckman model since the endogenous repressor (HMD_AC, HMD_CHAIR or HMD_FE) is 
dichotomous.   
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HMD_CHAIR has significant (p-value<0.01) association with previous year’s financial 
reporting quality, which suggests that a firm with high financial reporting quality might 
choose prestigious audit committee chair to signal its high quality.   The results of the 
treatment regressions (Table 18 Panel B) indicate that my conclusions are not hampered 
by the endogeneity issue since these results are consistent with my previous results.    
[Insert Table 18 about here] 
Taken together, as illustrated in Table 19, all the results show that: (1) While 
HMD_AC is not significantly associated with financial reporting quality for the entire 
sample, high MD among key audit committee members – audit committee chairs 
(HMD_CHAIR) and audit committee financial experts (HMD_FE) - is positively related 
to common proxies of financial reporting quality.  However, the effect of HMD_CHAIR 
on final reporting quality is mostly driven by audit committee chairs who are also 
financial experts and the effect of HMD_FE on financial reporting quality is mainly 
driven by firms with low MD; (2) There is an inverted U-Shaped relationship between the 
magnitude of multiple directorships and financial reporting quality, with an optimum 
percentage of high MD members about 47%; (3) Although an audit committee as a whole 
tends to have lower MD post-SOX, key audit committee members are more likely to have 
higher MD post-SOX, consistent with greater demand for higher quality audit committee 
members post-SOX.  However, supplemental analysis reveals that these increases in MD 
post-SOX are largely due to chairs and financial experts with low-MD pre-SOX 
increasing their directorships post-SOX.  Those with high MD pre SOX actually reduce 
the number of their directorships post SOX; (4) SOX mitigates the positive effects of 
HMD_CHAIR and HMD_FE on financial reporting quality that are observed earlier.  
[Insert Table 19 about here]
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CHAPTER 5:   CONCLUSION  
 
Following corporate governance failures like Enron and WorldCom, the role of 
the board of directors has come under increased scrutiny.  Audit committee effectiveness 
has become increasingly important following the financial scandals and has been the 
focus of regulatory changes in recent years. A major concern raised post Enron is that 
individuals hold too many directorships, as a result of which “they do not have the time 
to do their job” (Dougherty, 2002).  Corporate reformers, likewise, have advocated 
reforms to prevent poor governance resulting from overcommitted directors.  For 
instance, the Council of Institutional Investors suggests that individuals with full time 
jobs should not serve on more than two boards.  An alternative view is that directors with 
more outside board seats may be more experienced and prove to be better monitors.   
This study examines the phenomenon of multiple directorships of audit committee 
members by investigating its effect on financial reporting quality.  As audit committees 
are specifically charged with overseeing firms’ financial reporting quality, this study 
provides a stronger test of monitoring effectiveness in comparison with studies that 
examine overall board effectiveness.  Multiple directorships among audit committee 
members is common among big firms in the Unites States.  However, its effect on 
financial reporting quality has yet to be rigorously explored in the literature. Since the 
regulation change has make certain audit committee characteristics, such as audit 
committee independence and financial expertise somewhat uniformed across firms, it is 
more important to examine other characteristics of audit committee (DeFond and Francis 
2005), such as audit committee multiple directorships. In this study, I extend research in 
management and finance focusing on corporate boards to more specifically examine 
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multiple directorships on audit committees.  My study examines whether the multiple 
directorship characteristics of audit committees or their key members are associated with 
a firm’s financial reporting quality.  I also examine whether SOX has changed the 
incidence of multiple directorships as well as moderated the effects of multiple 
directorships on financial reporting quality.  
Existing theories (agency theory and labor market theory) predict that audit 
committee multiple directorships can affect the financial reporting quality in two 
competing ways. Agency theory predicts that audit committees with high multiple 
directorships might be subject to time constraints, which could adversely affect their 
financial reporting quality.  In contrast, labor market theory implies that audit committees 
(or audit committee members) with high multiple directorships might work more 
diligently because of the reputation concern, and might transfer their knowledge and 
experience across firms. As a result, high audit committees multiple directorships might 
be positively associated with good monitoring outcomes like higher financial reporting 
quality.    
Using data from S&P 500 companies during the period 1997–2005, I find that 
high multiple directorships on audit committees as a whole does not have a significant 
effect on firms’ financial reporting quality.  Instead, what appears to be important is who 
on the audit committee is “busy,” as multiple directorships of audit committee chairs and 
financial experts are positively associated with a firm’s financial reporting quality.  The 
results are consistent with the labor market theory, suggesting audit committee focal 
points with high multiple directorships might work diligently as they have a higher 
reputational capital at stake, and might transfer their knowledge and experience across 
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firms.   Further, additional analysis suggests that the positive association between AC 
chair with high MD and FRQ is driven by the scenario in which the AC chair is also a 
financial expert.  In addition, I find there is an inverted U-shape relation between the 
percentage of AC member with MD and FRQ, with the optimal level around 47%, 
suggesting that while some degree of multiple directorships at the audit committee level 
is beneficial from a monitoring perspective, beyond a certain point, the costs of multiple 
directorships outweigh its benefits.   
I also investigate the effects of SOX on multiple directorships.  In the audit 
committee level, I find that an audit committee as a whole tends to have lower MD post-
SOX.  For the key audit committee members, perhaps due to its more stringent 
requirements relating to qualifications of audit committee members, SOX has 
significantly increased the incidence of multiple directorships for audit committee chairs 
and financial experts. However, further analysis shows that only the key members with 
low multiple directorships in the pre SOX period are more likely to increase their number 
of directorships post SOX, suggesting  that the regulation change potentially marks a 
significant shift in the equilibrium number of additional directorships of audit committee 
members.  Finally, when financial reporting quality is proxied for by performance 
matched abnormal accruals, the effects of multiple directorships of audit committee focal 
points on financial reporting quality changes from a positive association pre SOX to a 
negative association post-SOX, indicating that the costs of multiple directorships post- 
SOX might be greater than the benefits, which is reinforced by my finding that the 
number of audit committee meetings significantly increases post SOX. 
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My study contributes to the literature on multiple directorships and audit 
committee effectiveness. This study adds to the stream of audit committee effectiveness 
research by focusing on the multiple directorships issue, an issue extensively examined in 
the management and finance literature but yet to be fully explored in accounting 
literature.   My results also speak to regulators’ and shareholders’ concern that high AC-
MD could lead to ineffective monitoring.  Generally, my findings do not validate their 
concerns. As I discuss in the paper, there is a trade off between costs of MD induced by 
time commitment and the reputational and experiential benefits of MD. While regulators 
such as the NYSE have expressed concern over AC-MD, my results indicate that on 
average the benefits of AC-MD outweigh the costs of AC-MD in terms of improved 
financial reporting quality. 
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APPENDIX 1: SAMPLE PROXY DISCLOSURES OF MD 
 
a. Excerpts from GE 2008 proxy statement: 
 
Shareowner Proposal No. 4 – Curb Over-Extended Directors   
 
“………Shareholders request that board service for our Directors be limited to a total 
of 3 directorships………….” 
 
“Our company is in very complex and diverse businesses and consequently we should 
expect our directors to have the time for a special commitment to our company — and 
not be overextended by excessive commitments to other companies……………..” 
 
“As recently as 2006 three of our directors served on 5 to 10 boards each. The 2007 
edition of this proposal won the highest vote of any 2007 GE shareholder proposal. 
………….” 
 
Board of Directors recommends a vote AGAINST this proposal.  
“All of the GE directors have demonstrated great commitments of time, energy and 
oversight to GE….” 
 
 
b. GE’s audit committee multiple directorship (year 2005) 
 
LNAME FNAME 
# of  
directorships    High MD 
Warner III (Chair) Douglas A. 3 Yes 
Langone Kenneth G. 5 Yes 
Gonzalez Laporte Claudio X. 4 Yes 
Cash Jr. James I. 4 Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c. Excerpts from Brown Forman’s 2007 proxy statement: 
 
“Mr. O’Neil also sits on the audit committee of more than three other public 
companies. Our Board has determined that his service on other audit committees does not 
impair, but indeed enhances, his ability to sit on our Audit Committee.”  
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APPENDIX 2: AN EXAMPLE OF THE MEASUREMTNS OF HMD_AC 
An example to illustrate the difference between the method in this study and that in 
previous literature regarding the measurement of high audit committee multiple 
directorships (HMD_AC) 
 
 
Assume both the two methods use three directorships as a threshold.  
  
Example: suppose Company ABC has three audit committee members as follows: 
 
Name Directorships 
Tom 10 
David 1 
Jen 1 
 
 
Method 1: use the average number of directorships to code HMD_AC (adopted by prior 
literature) 
 
Average directorships=(10+1+1)/3=4  
 
Since 4>3, this company is considered as the one with high audit committee multiple 
directorships.  
 
 
Method 2: use the majority rule (>50%) to code HMD_AC (adopted by current study) 
 
Step 1: Judge if the individual AC member has high MD 
 
Name Directorships High MD  
Tom 10 Yes 
David 1 No 
Jen 1 No 
 
 
Step 2: Apply the majority rule (>50%) 
Since two of three audit committee members are not with high MD, the whole audit 
committee is considered as the one with low audit committee multiple directorships.  
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APPENDIX 3: TABLES 
Table 1:Sample Selection 
This table shows the sample selection process (Panel A) and samples distribution by year and industry (Panel B). The 
initial sample consists of all S&P 500 firms that appear in the RiskMetrics database15 from 1997 to 2005. Financial 
institutions and foreign firms are excluded. Observations without sufficient data are also excluded. The final sample 
size is 3169 firm-years. They are related to 11516 director-years, 544 unique companies and 3065 unique directors.  
 
Panel A: Sample Selection Process 
 
         Firm-Years 
Initial S&P 500 Sample  for 1997–2005 4500 
Financial Institutions (four-digit SIC code: 6000–6999)  
 
  
 
(588) 
Foreign firms (36) 
Missing data in RiskMetrics Directors Database (268) 
Missing data in ExecuComp Database (364) 
Missing data in Compustat    (75)
Final sample 3169 
 
 
Panel B: Sample Distribution by Year and Industry16  
 
Year
Agriculture 
forestry and 
fish
Construction 
Industries Manufacturing
Mineral 
Industries
Retail 
Trade Service 
Transportation 
and 
Communication
Wholesale 
Trade Total
1997 1 3 188 14 29 26 53 7 321
1998 0 3 200 14 33 37 57 8 352
1999 0 2 199 12 30 38 54 9 344
2000 0 3 191 13 32 41 54 8 342
2001 0 3 206 13 33 47 57 8 367
2002 0 2 202 13 34 49 56 8 364
2003 0 3 209 13 36 51 58 9 379
2004 0 5 200 12 33 48 51 9 358
2005 0 5 191 15 32 44 47 8 342
1 29 1786 119 292 381 487 74 3169
 
                                                 
15 This database was formerly known as the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) database. 
16 The classification of industry is based on two digits SIC code. 
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Table 2: Variable Definitions 
This table shows how the major variables in this study are defined and measured, and identifies the data sources used. 
The first column classifies all variables into six categories: proxies for financial reporting quality, audit committee 
characteristics, individual audit committee member characteristics, board characteristics, other corporate governance 
characteristics and firm specific variable. The second column describes the measurements. The third column reports the 
acronym for each variable and the last column identifies the data sources.  
Variables Operationalization Acronym Sources 
 
1. Proxies for Financial Reporting Quality 
 
Abnormal 
accruals 
 
 
 
 
Accounting 
restatements 
 
 
Earnings 
informativeness 
 
Absolute value of performance matched abnormal 
accruals measured as abnormal accrual minus the 
median abnormal accrual  for a portfolio of firms 
(with the same 2- digit SIC code Year) in the same 
ROA decile  
 
Dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if current 
year’s final statements need to be restated and zero 
otherwise 
 
The coefficients of three interaction terms:  
HMD_AC, HMD_CHAIR and HMD_FE interacted 
with firm’s annual earning (NI) 
ABS_PMDA 
 
 
 
 
 
RES  
 
 
 
NI* HMD_AC 
NI*HMD_CHAIR 
NI*HMD_FE         
COMPUSTAT 
 
 
 
 
 
Audit Analytics 
 
 
 
COMPUSTAT 
and CRSP 
 
2. Audit Committee Characteristics 
 
High audit 
committee 
multiple 
directorships  
 
Dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if a firm’s 
audit committee is classified as high-MD (more than 
50% of audit committee members have at least three 
multiple directorships) and 0 otherwise. 
 
HMD_AC 
 
RISKMETRICS  
 
Focal points 
multiple 
directorships: 
Audit committee 
chair with high 
multiple 
directorships  
 
Dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if a firm’s  
audit committee chair has greater than or equal to 
three directorships and zero otherwise 
 
HMD_CHAIR 
 
RISKMETRICS 
 and Proxy 
Statements 
 
Focal points 
multiple 
directorships: 
Audit committee 
financial experts 
with high 
multiple 
directorships 
 
Dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if all of a 
firm’s audit committee financial experts have greater 
than or equal to three directorships and zero 
otherwise 
 
HMD_FE 
 
RISKMETRICS 
and Proxy 
Statements 
 
Size of audit 
committee  
 
Total number of audit committee members. 
 
AC_SIZE 
 
RISKMETRICS  
 
Audit committee 
independence 
 
Average AC 
multiple 
directorships 
 
 
Percentage of the audit committee members in a 
company who are independent 
 
Average number of directorships for audit committee 
members 
 
 
AC_IND 
 
 
AVE_ACMD 
 
RISKMETRICS  
 
 
RISKMETRICS 
Audit committee 
meeting 
frequency 
Number of AC meetings for each fiscal year AC_MEET Proxy 
Statements 
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Variables Operationalization Acronym Sources 
 
Audit committee 
chair is also 
financial expert 
 
Dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if audit 
committee chair is also financial expert and zero 
otherwise 
 
 
CHAIR_FE 
 
Proxy 
Statements 
3. Individual Audit Committee Member Characteristics 
 
Individual audit 
committee 
member 
directorships 
Total number of directorships of each audit committee 
member 
NUM_DIR RISKMETRICS 
Audit committee 
member is a 
chair with high 
directorships 
(three or more 
directorships) 
 
Dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if an audit 
committee member is an audit committee chair and 
has high multiple directorships; takes on a value of 
zero if an audit committee member is an audit 
committee chair but has low multiple directorships.  
An audit committee member with three or more 
directorships is considered to have HMD. 
 
HMD(CHAIR) 17
 
RISKMETRICS 
and Proxy 
Statements  
Audit committee 
member is a 
financial expert 
with high 
directorships 
(three or more 
directorships) 
Dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if an audit 
committee member is an audit committee financial 
expert and has high multiple directorships; takes on a 
value of zero if an audit committee member is an 
audit committee financial expert but has low multiple 
directorships. 
HMD(FE) RISKMETRICS 
and Proxy 
Statements  
    
Audit committee 
member is CEO  
 
Dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if audit 
committee member is CEO and  zero otherwise 
CEO  RISKMETRICS 
Audit committee 
member is 
retired 
 
Dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if audit 
committee member is retired  and zero otherwise 
RETIRE RISKMETRICS  
4. Board Characteristics 
Size of Board Number of board directors  BD_Size RISKMETRICS  
 
Board 
Independence 
 
Average board  
MD 
 
 
Percentage of independent members on the board of 
directors 
 
Average number of directorships for board members 
 
BD_IND 
 
 
AVE_BDMD 
 
RISKMETRICS  
 
 
RISKMETRICS 
5.Other Corporate Governance Control Variables 
 
 
CEO ownership Percentage of common equity shares owned by the 
CEO 
 
MGMT_HOLD 
 
ExecuComp 
CEO Power  Number of years the current CEO has been in the 
position 
 
 
 
 
CEO_TENURE ExecuComp 
                                                 
17 It is possible that several firms have the same person as AC Chair. So, this variable, which is measured at the individual level is 
different from HMD_CHAIR, which indicates multiple directorships of audit committee chairs at the firm level. 
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Variables Operationalization Acronym Sources 
 
 
6. Firm-specific Variables 
 
 
Fiscal year 
return  
12-month cumulative raw return for fiscal year t. The 
12-month interval begins three months after the end 
of the fiscal year t-1 and ends three months 
after the end of fiscal year t. 
 
RET CRSP 
Net income  Annual earnings (before extraordinary items, 
COMPUSTAT data item 123) for fiscal year t,  
deflated by pervious year’s  market value  
NI COMPUSTAT 
    
Firm Growth Market value of the total firm over book value of 
assets, measured at the beginning of the fiscal year 
 
MV/BV COMPUSTAT 
Firm Leverage 
 
Long-term debt divided by previous year’s assets LEV COMPUSTAT 
Firm financial 
distress 
 
An indicator if the firm had two or more consecutive 
years of negative income, ending on the fiscal year 
prior to the shareholders’ meeting 
 
NEG_NI COMPUSTAT 
Volatility The absolute value of the change in net income 
between previous year and current year (deflated by 
last year’s assets) 
 
ABS_NICHANGE COMPUSTAT 
Firm Size  
 
 
The natural log of the total assets 
 
 
LOG_ASSETS 
 
 
COMPUSTAT 
 
 
7. Other important Variables 
 
  
SOX indicator SOX takes on the value of one after year 2002 and 
zero otherwise.  
 
SOX  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Related to Board and AC Characteristics  
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for variables related to board and audit committee characteristics. 
Panel A describes the full sample. Panel B compares pre SOX (before year 2002 (including year 2002)) and 
post SOX (after year 2002) sub samples. See Table 2 for all variable definitions. *, **, ***, indicate 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively.  
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median
Lower 
Quartile
Upper 
Quartile
BD_Size 3169 10.688 2.471 11 9 12
BD_IND 3169 0.709 0.15 0.727 0.625 0.818
AVE_BDMD 3169 2.277 0.651 2.214 1.818 2.667
AC_Size 3169 4.166 1.241 4 3 5
AC_IND 3169 0.908 0.159 1 0.8 1
AVE_ACMD 3169 2.346 0.86 2.25 1.75 3
HMD_AC 3169 0.273 0.446 0 0 1
HMD_CHAIR 2690 a 0.414 0.493 0 0 1
HMD_FE 2176 b 0.296 0.457 0 0 1
AC_MEET 2002 c 5.471 2.845 5 3 7
CHAIR_FE 2690 a 0.267 0.443 0 0 1  
a. reduced sample size is due to the  fact that some firms don’t identify their audit commit chairs in their 
proxy statements.  
b. reduced ample size is because it is only for the sub sample with at least one financial expert. 
c. reduced sample size is because of the fact that some firms do not explicitly disclose the audit committee 
meeting frequency in their proxy statements.  
 
Panel B: Pre-SOX vs. Post-SOX  
 Pre-SOX Post-SOX   
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median
T-test of 
Mean difference
Wilcoxon test of 
Median difference
BD_Size 
AVE_BDMD 
BD_IND 
AC_Size 
AVE_ACMD 
AC_IND 
HMD_AC 
HMD_CHAIR 
HMD_FE 
AC_MEET 
CHAIR_FE 
2090 
2090 
2090 
2090 
2090 
2090 
2090 
1680 
1360 
1491 
1680 
10.896 
2.359 
0.692 
4.243 
2.419 
0.887 
0.294 
0.412 
0.307 
4.888 
0.220 
11.000
2.300
0.714
4.000
2.333
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
4.000
0.000
1079 
1079 
1079 
1079 
1079 
1079 
1079 
1010 
816 
511 
1010 
10.285
2.119
0.742
4.017
2.205
0.951
0.234
0.418
0.278
7.172 
0.359 
10.000
2.091 
0.769 
4.000 
2.000 
1.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
7.000 
0.000 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
 
 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
 
 
*** 
*** 
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Table 4:  Descriptive Statistics of Variables Related to  
Individual AC Member Characteristics 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for variables related to individual audit committee member 
characteristics. Panel A, Panel B and Panel C are for the full sample, chairs sub-sample and financial 
experts sub-sample respectively. Pre-SOX refers to observations before year 2002 (including year 2002) 
and post-SOX reefers to observation after year 2002. See Table 2 for all variables’ definitions. *, **, ***, 
indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively.  
 
Panel A: Full Sample   
Summary 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median
Lower 
Quartile
Upper 
Quartile 
NUM_DIR 
CEO 
RETIRE 
11516
11516
11516
2.240
0.204
0.180
1.355
0.403
0.384
2.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
3.000 
0.000 
0.000 
  
 
Pre-SOX vs. Post-SOX 
 Pre-SOX Post-SOX   
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median
T-test of 
Mean difference
Wilcoxon test of 
Median difference
NUM_DIR 
CEO 
RETIRE 
7894 
7894 
7894 
 
2.261 
0.225 
0.143 
 
2.000
0.000
0.000
 
3622 
3622 
3622 
 
2.194
0.159
0.261
 
2.000 
0.000 
0.000 
 
*** 
*** 
*** 
 
 
*** 
*** 
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Panel B: Audit Committee Chair Sub-Sample  
 
Summary 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median
Lower 
Quartile
Upper 
Quartile 
NUM_DIR 
CEO 
RETIRE 
2573
2573
2573
2.412
0.167
0.227
1.449
0.373
0.419
2.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
3.000 
0.000 
0.000 
  
Pre-SOX vs. Post-SOX 
 Pre-SOX Post-SOX   
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median
T-test of 
Mean difference
Wilcoxon test of 
Median difference
NUM_DIR 
CEO 
RETIRE 
1637 
1637 
1637 
2.442 
0.192 
0.177 
2.000
0.000
0.000
 
936
936
936 
2.360
0.124
0.315 
2.000 
0.000 
0.000 
 
 
*** 
*** 
 
 
*** 
*** 
 
 
Panel C: Audit Committee Financial Experts Sub-Sample 
` 
Summary 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median
Lower 
Quartile
Upper 
Quartile 
NUM_DIR 
CEO 
RETIRE 
2916
2916
2916
2.105
0.150
0.134
1.303
0.357
0.340
2.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
3.000 
0.000 
0.000 
  
Pre-SOX vs. Post-SOX 
 Pre-SOX Post-SOX   
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median
T-test of 
Mean difference
Wilcoxon test of 
Median difference
NUM_DIR 
CEO 
RETIRE 
1775 
1775 
1775 
2.087 
0.171 
0.098 
2.000
0.000
0.000
 
1141
1141
1141 
2.132
0.117
0.189 
2.000 
0.000 
0.000 
 
 
*** 
*** 
 
*** 
*** 
*** 
  
Table 5: Summary Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Control Variables 
  
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median
Lower 
Quartile
Upper 
Quartile
ABS_PMDA 3169 0.048 0.055 0.031 0.014 0.062
RES 1810 0.19 0.392 0 0 0
CEO_TENURE 3169 6.24 6.832 4 2 8
MGMT_HOLD 3169 0.032 0.717 0.001 0 0.004
MV/BV 3169 4.509 11.126 3.04 1.926 5.306
NEG_NI 3169 0.125 0.331 0 0 0
ABS 0.115 0.022 0.009 0.051
LEV 0.183 0.213 0.109 0.321
LOG_ 1.171 8.813 7.992 9.7
 
 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for other variables, including dependent variables and all control 
variables. See Table 2 for all variable definitions. 
 
_NICHANGE 3169 0.048
3169 0.231
ASSETS 3169 8.874  
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Va
RES
HM
HM
HM
A
B
C
MG
MV
Ne
AB
N
LE
LO
 0.06*** 1 -0.03 -0.06** -0.06** 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06** 0.13*** 0.06*** 0.02 0.04 
D_AC -0.03 -0.03 1 0.46*** 0.47*** 0.04** 0.08*** -0.06*** -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0 0.17*** 
D_CHAIR -0.07*** -0.06** 0.46*** 1 0.33*** 0 0.02 -0.05** -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.14*** 
D_FE -0.06*** -0.06** 0.47*** 0.33*** 1 0.06*** 0 -0.06*** -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0 0.02 0.14*** 
C_IND 0 0.01 0.04** 0 0.05** 1 0.54*** -0.08*** -0.01 0 0.05*** 0.03* 0.01 0.04** 
D_IND -0.04** -0.04* 0.08*** 0.02 0 0.48*** 1 -0.2*** -0.01 -0.04** 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.09*** 
EO_TENURE -0.02 -0.05** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.03* -0.14*** 1 0.01 0.01 -0.07*** -0.01 -0.05*** -0.07***
MT_HOLD 0.06*** -0.04 -0.07*** -0.02 -0.06*** -0.11*** -0.19*** 0.44*** 1 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 
/BV 0.15*** -0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05** -0.06*** -0.12*** 0.02 -0.02 1 -0.07*** 0.03 -0.03 -0.05***
g_NI 0.06*** 0.13*** -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.05*** 0.02 -0.1*** -0.06*** -0.2*** 1 0.27*** 0.02 -0.03* 
S_ 
ICHANGE 
0.27*** 0.08*** -0.01 -0.01 0 0 -0.02 -0.04** -0.01 0.14*** 0.3*** 1 -0.07*** -0.11***
V -0.18*** 0 0 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.08*** -0.04** -0.05** -0.25*** 0.02 -0.2*** 1 0.23*** 
G_ASSETS -0.21*** 0.01 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.04** 0.12*** -0.06*** -0.29*** -0.16*** -0.03 -0.21*** 0.29*** 1 
Table 6: Pearson & Spearman Correlations of Major Variables 
 
This table reports the Pearson & Spearman correlations of major variables. The upper triangle reports Pearson correlations and the lower triangle reports 
Spearman correlation. See table two for all variable definitions.  *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
 
riable 
ABS_ 
PMDA 
RES HMD_AC HMD_ 
CHAIR 
HMD_FE AC_IND BD_IND CEO_ 
TENURE
MGMT_ 
HOLD 
MV/BV Neg_NI ABS_ 
NICHANGE
LEV LOG 
_ASSETS
ABS_PMDA 1 0.05** -0.03 -0.07*** -0.03 -0.01 -0.05*** 0.03 -0.01 0.1*** 0.05*** 0.34*** -0.09*** -0.17***
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Table 7: The Association between Audit Committee Multiple Directorships and 
Financial Reporting Quality  
 
This table reports the results of tests of H1: the association between Audit Committee Multiple 
Directorships and Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ).  Panel A, B, C report results using three proxies of 
FRQ (abnormal accruals, accounting restatements and earnings informativenss) respectively. In Panel A 
and C, the numbers in parenthesis are two tailed absolute t-statistics. In Panel B, the numbers in 
parentheses are wald chi-square values.  See Table 2 for all variable definitions.  *, **, ***, indicate 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. 
 
Panel A: Abnormal Accruals Models  
 
                   Dependent Variable: Log_ABS_PMDA 
Variable 
Pred. 
Signs 
Model 1a:  
HMD_AC 
Model 1b: 
HMD_CHAIR 
Model 1c: 
HMD_FE 
INTERCEPT  -2.374 -2.557 -2.655 
  ( 10.519)*** ( 10.326)*** ( 9.892)*** 
HMD_AC ? 0.017   
  ( 0.354)   
HMD_CHAIR ?  -0.122  
   ( 2.552)**  
HMD_FE ?   -0.113 
    ( 2.001)** 
BD_IND - -0.081 0.062 0.126 
  ( 0.537) ( 0.365) ( 0.684) 
CEO_TENURE + -0.003 -0.003 0.002 
  ( 0.786) ( 0.812) ( 0.387) 
MGMT_HOLD + 1.011 0.538 0.39 
  ( 1.355) ( 0.653) ( 0.463) 
MV/BV + 0.018 0.012 0.023 
  ( 4.112)*** ( 2.437)** ( 4.353)*** 
ABS_NICHANGE + 3.683 3.498 3.5 
  ( 10.195)*** ( 8.697)*** ( 8.62)*** 
NEG_NI + 0.011 -0.003 0.035 
  ( 0.158) ( 0.034) ( 0.424) 
LEV + -0.389 -0.358 -0.597 
  ( 2.81)*** ( 2.357)** ( 3.64)*** 
LOG_ASSETS - -0.156 -0.133 -0.13 
  ( 7.72)*** ( 6.1)*** ( 5.266)*** 
Adj R-Sq  0.09 0.06 0.09 
N  3169 2690 2176 
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   Panel B: Accounting Restatements Models       
                
                    Dependent Variable: RES 
Variable 
Pred. 
Signs 
Model 2a: 
HMD_AC 
Model 2b: 
HMD_CHAIR 
Model 2c: 
HMD_FE 
INTERCEPT  -2.175 -2.375 -1.501 
  ( 14.683)*** ( 15.393)*** ( 5.355)** 
HMD_AC ? -0.269   
  ( 3.234)*   
HMD_CHAIR ?  -0.388  
   ( 8.19)***  
HMD_FE ?   -0.348 
    ( 4.44)** 
BD_IND - -0.704 -0.573 -1.062 
  ( 2.606) ( 1.47) ( 4.262)** 
CEO_TENURE + -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 
  ( 0.17) ( 0.152) ( 0.004) 
MGMT_HOLD + -1.356 -1.423 -1.671 
  ( 0.388) ( 0.403) ( 0.528) 
MV/BV + -0.01 -0.01 -0.008 
  ( 3.983)** ( 3.733)* ( 2.255) 
ABS_NICHANGE + 0.324 0.333 0.249 
  ( 0.784) ( 0.789) ( 0.445) 
NEG_NI + 0.723 0.672 0.827 
  ( 21.267)*** ( 16.778)*** ( 21.272)*** 
LEV + -0.012 -0.106 -0.309 
  ( 0.001) ( 0.073) ( 0.487) 
LOG_ASSETS - 0.133 0.156 0.102 
  ( 5.942)** ( 7.66)*** ( 2.571) 
Likelihood-Ratio  <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Pseudo R-Sq  0.0345 0.0380 0.0398 
Na  1810 1655 1327 
 
 
                          a   Reduced sample size is because accounting restatements data is only available after 
   year 2000.  
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   Panel C: Earnings Informativeness Models     
                  
                  Dependent Variable:RET (12-month cumulative raw return for firm i for fiscal year t) 
 
 
Variable 
Pred. 
Signs 
Model 3a 
HMD_AC 
Model 3b 
HMD_CHAIR 
Model 3c 
HMD_FE 
INTERCEPT  0.78 0.717 0.289 
  ( 2.182)** ( 1.864)* ( 0.704) 
NI + 0.648 1.008 2.3 
  ( 0.388) ( 0.55) ( 1.213) 
NI*HMD_AC ? -0.209   
  ( 0.336)   
NI*HMD_CHAIR ?  -0.985  
   ( 1.849)*  
NI*HMD_FE ?   0.495 
    ( 0.864) 
CHANGNI + 0.113 0.247 0.11 
  ( 0.436) ( 0.771) ( 0.344) 
CHANGNI*HMD_AC ? 0.195   
  ( 0.353)   
CHANGNI*HMD_CHAIR ?  0.057  
   ( 0.113)  
CHANGNI*HMD_FE ?   0.599 
    ( 1.154) 
NI*MV/BV + 0.104 0.112 0.062 
  ( 3.419)*** ( 3.426)*** ( 0.998) 
NI*LEV - -0.323 -0.301 0.908 
  ( 0.249) ( 0.2) ( 0.634) 
NI*LOSS - -0.613 -0.725 -0.729 
  ( 1.435) ( 1.43) ( 1.381) 
NI*LOG_ASSETS + -0.051 -0.034 -0.255 
  ( 0.301) ( 0.186) ( 1.335) 
HMD_AC ? 0.07   
  ( 1.656)*   
HMD_CHAIR ?  0.079  
   ( 1.939)*  
HMD_FE ?   -0.009 
    ( 0.215) 
 
 
                                                                                                               Continued on next page  
 
 83
84  
 
 TABLE 7, PANEL C:  Continued from previous page  
 
Variable 
Pred. 
Signs 
Model 3a 
HMD_AC 
Model 3b 
HMD_CHAIR 
Model 3c 
HMD_FE 
MV/BV ? -0.008 -0.008 -0.005 
  ( 4.231)*** ( 3.836)*** ( 1.541) 
LEV ? -0.005 0.009 -0.078 
  ( 0.05) ( 0.073) ( 0.744) 
LOSS ? -0.214 -0.178 -0.159 
  ( 3.636)*** ( 2.663)*** ( 2.463)** 
LOG_MV ? -0.043 -0.04 -0.014 
  ( 2.59)*** ( 2.103)** ( 0.752) 
Joint Tests:      
     
NI*HMD_AC+ 
CHANGNI*HMD_AC=0 
? -0.014   
  ( 0.03)   
NI*HMD_CHAIR+ 
CHANGNI*HMD_CHAIR=0 
?  -0.928  
   ( 2.251)**  
NI*HMD_FE+ 
CHANGNI*HMD_FE=0 
?   1.094 
    ( 2.305)** 
Adj R-Sq  0.025 0.024 0.027 
Na  3097 2627 2128 
 
a  Reduced sample size is because of missing data. 
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Table 8: The Effect of SOX on the Incidence of Audit Committee Multiple 
Directorships 
 
This table presents results of tests of H2: the SOX effect on the incidence of HMD_AC, HMD(CHAIR) 
and HMD(FE). The dependent variables are HMD_AC (Model 4a), HMD(CHAIR) (Model 4b) and 
HMD(FE) (Model 4c). SOX takes on the value of one for years after 2002, and zero otherwise. See Table 2 
for all other variable definitions.  *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels 
respectively. 
 
Variable 
Pred. 
Signs 
Model 4a:  
HMD_AC 
Model 4b: 
HMD(CHAIR) 
Model 4c:  
HMD (FE) 
INTERCEPT  -6.608 -3.393 -6.853 
  ( 0.019) ( 0.005) ( 0.007) 
SOX ? -0.375 0.762 0.778 
  ( 7.344)*** ( 8.121)*** ( 13.559)*** 
MV/BV + 0.003   
  ( 0.495)   
NEG_NI - 0.097   
  ( 0.22)   
LOG_ASSETS + 0.042   
  ( 0.045)   
CEO +  0.334 -0.13 
   ( 0.574) ( 0.132) 
RETIRE -  -2.89 -1.516 
   ( 53.194)*** ( 16.113)*** 
Likelihood-Ratio  <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Pseudo R-Sq  0.4255 0.6585 0.6139 
N  3169 2573 2916 
  Firm-years Chair-years FE-years 
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Table 9: The Effect of SOX on the Association between AC_MD and FRQ   
This table reports the results of the tests of H3: the effect of SOX on the association between AC MD and 
FRQ. Panel A, B are for two proxies of FRQ (abnormal accruals and earnings informativenss) respectively. 
In both Panel A and B, the numbers in parenthesis are two tailed absolute t-statistics. See table two for all 
variable definitions.  *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
 
Panel A: Abnormal Accrual Models (Dependent Variable: Log_ABS_PMDA) 
Variable 
Pred. 
Signs 
Model 5a: 
HMD_AC 
Model 5b: 
HMD_CHAIR
Model 5c: 
HMD_FE 
INTERCEPT  -2.41 -2.613 -2.665 
  ( 11.54)*** ( 11.222)*** ( 10.709)*** 
SOX - -0.128 -0.13 -0.164
  ( 2.361)** ( 2.036)** ( 2.533)** 
HMD_AC ? -0.062   
  ( 1.037)  
SOX*HMD_AC ? 0.228   
  ( 2.171)**  
HMD_CHAIR ?  -0.193  
   ( 3.186)*** 
SOX*HMD_CHAIR ?  0.168  
   ( 1.713)* 
HMD_FE ?   -0.206
    ( 2.915)***
SOX*HMD_FE ?   0.2
    ( 2.277)**
BD_IND - -0.038 0.083 0.1
  ( 0.253) ( 0.491) ( 0.877) 
CEO_TENURE + -0.003 -0.003 0.0
  ( 0.84) ( 0.839) ( 0.368) 
MGMT_HOLD + 1.216 0.77 0.5
  ( 1.622) ( 0.93) ( 0.652) 
MV/BV + 0.019 0.012 0.0
  ( 4.455)*** ( 2.573)** ( 4.491)*** 
ABS_NICHANGE + 3.992 3.802 3.87 
  ( 11.018)*** ( 9.423)*** ( 9.514)*** 
NEG_NI + 0.003 -0.019 0.0
  ( 0.047) ( 0.253) ( 0.114) 
LEV + -0.399 -0.35 -0.6
  ( 2.874)*** ( 2.299)** ( 3.763)*** 
LOG_ASSETS - -0.149 -0.127 -0.1
  ( 7.373)*** ( 5.814)*** ( 5.037)*** 
Joint Tests:
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
65 
  
62 
02 
52 
24 
09 
19 
24 
     
HMD_AC+HMD_AC*SOX=0 ? 0.167   
  ( 1.899)*  
HMD_CHAIR+HMD_CHAIR*SOX=0 ?  -0.025  
   ( 0.323) 
HMD_FE+HMD_FE*SOX=0 ?   0.059 
    ( 0.633)
Adj R-Sq  0.09 0.07 0.10 
N  3169 2690 217
 
 
  
6 
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Panel B: Earnings Informativeness Models 
 
  Dependent Variable: RET (12-month cumulative raw return for firm i for fiscal year t) 
Variable 
Pred. 
Signs 
Model 6a 
HMD_AC 
Model 6b 
HMD_ 
CHAIR 
Model 6c 
HMD_FE 
INTERCEPT  0.845 0.766 0.322 
  ( 2.371)** ( 1.995)** ( 0.788) 
NI + 0.722 0.8 2.4
  ( 0.434) ( 0.44) ( 1.318) 
NI*HMD_AC ? 0.251  
  ( 0.339)  
NI*HMD_CHAIR ?  -0.093 
   ( 0.134)
NI*HMD_FE ?   0.3
    ( 0.499)
SOX ? 0.167 0.1 0.1
  ( 4.941)*** ( 4.273)*** ( 4.351)*** 
SOX*NI*HMD_AC ? -2.019  
  ( 2.128)**  
SOX*CHANGNI*HMD_AC ? -0.525   
  ( 0.571)  
SOX*NI*HMD_CHAIR ?  -1.555 
   ( 1.907)*
SOX*CHANGNI*HMD_CHAIR ?  1.28  
   ( 1.638)
SOX*NI*HMD_FE ?   -0.3
    ( 0.453)
SOX*CHANGNI*HMD_FE ?   -0.256
    ( 0.301)
NI*MV/BV + 0.099 0.111 0.0
  ( 3.269)*** ( 3.396)*** ( 0.417) 
NI*LEV - -0.003 0.234 
  ( 0.002) ( 0.149) ( 0.839) 
NI*LOSS - -0.556 -0.495 -0.7
  ( 1.303) ( 0.95) ( 1.324) 
NI*LOG_MV + -0.059 -0.032 -0.2
  ( 0.351) ( 0.172) ( 1.377) 
HMD_AC ? 0.101  
  ( 2.34)**  
HMD_CHAIR ?  0.068 
   ( 1.64)
HMD_FE ?   0.0
    ( 0.35)
 
08 97 
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Table 9, Panel B: Continued from previous page 
 
Variable 
Pred. 
Signs 
Model 6a 
HMD_AC 
Model 6b 
HMD_ 
CHAIR 
Model 6c 
HMD_FE 
 
MV/BV ? -0.007 -0.007 -0.003 
  ( 3.95)*** ( 3.682)*** ( 0.853) 
LEV ? 0.027 0.023 -0.035 
  ( 0.273) ( 0.191) ( 0.33) 
LOSS ? -0.188 -0.154 -0.138 
  ( 3.191)*** ( 2.302)** ( 2.136)** 
LOG_MV ? -0.053 -0.048 -0.026 
  ( 3.131)*** ( 2.496)** ( 1.37) 
Joint Tests:    
NI*HMD_AC+CHANGNI*HMD_AC=0 ? 0.682   
  ( 1.285) 
NI*HMD_CHAIR+CHANGNI*HMD_CHAIR=0 ?  -0.801  
   ( 1.777)*
NI*HMD_FE+CHANGNI*HMD_FE=0 ?   1.137
   ( 2.121)**
NI*HMD_AC+CHANGNI*HMD_AC  
+SOX*NI*HMD_AC+SOX*CHANGNI*HMD_AC=0 
? -1.863 
( 2.477)** 
  
   
NI*HMD_CHAIR+CHANGNI*HMD_CHAIR  
+SOX*NI*HMD_CHAIR+SOX*CHANGNI*HMD_CHAIR
=0 
?  -1.076 
( 1.724)* 
 
   
NI*HMD_FE+CHANGNI*HMD_FE  
+SOX*NI*HMD_FE+SOX*CHANGNI*HMD_FE=0 
?   0.486 
( 0.586) 
   
Adj R-Sq  0.034 0.031 0.036 
N  3097 2627 2128 
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Table 10: Supplementary Test 1 
Testing for an Inverse U-Shaped Relation between HMD_AC_PER 
(Percentage of AC Members with High-MD) and FRQ 
 
This table reports the results of the test on the relation between  HMD_AC_PER (Percentage of 
AC Members with High-MD) and FRQ. The dependent variable (Log_ABS_PMDA) is the natural 
log of the absolute value of performance matched abnormal accruals. The key variable is 
HMD_AC_PER, a continuous variable used to measure AC-MD. HMD_AC_PER_SQR is the 
square term of HMD_AC_PER. See Table 2 for all other variable definitions. The numbers in 
parenthesis are two-tailed absolute t-statistics.  *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent levels respectively. 
 
                      Dependent Variable: Log_ABS_PMDA 
Variable 
Pred. 
Signs Estimates 
INTERCEPT   -2.371 
   ( 10.521)*** 
HMD_AC_PER -  -0.451 
   ( 1.994)** 
HMD_AC_PER_SQR +  0.479 
   ( 1.926)* 
BD_IND -  -0.056 
   ( 0.371) 
CEO_TENURE +  -0.003 
   ( 0.887) 
MGMT_HOLD +  1.057 
   ( 1.417) 
MV/BV +  0.018 
   ( 4.119)*** 
ABS_NICHANGE +  3.687 
   ( 10.21)*** 
NEG_NI +  0.009 
   ( 0.129) 
LEV +  -0.392 
   ( 2.826)*** 
LOG_ASSETS -  -0.151 
   ( 7.403)*** 
Adj R-Sq   0.09 
N   3169 
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Table 11: Supplementary Test 2 
Testing if the Effect of HMD_CHAIR on FRQ are Driven by CHAIR_FE 
(AC CHAIR and FE are the Same Person)  
 
This table reports the results of the test of the effect of CHAIR_FE (CHAIR and FE are the same 
person) on the association between HMD_CHAIR and FRQ. The dependent variable 
(Log_ABS_PMDA) is the natural log of the absolute value of performance matched abnormal 
accruals. See Table 2 for all variable definitions. The numbers in parenthesis are two tailed 
absolute t-statistics.  *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
 
                   Dependent Variable: Log_ABS_PMDA 
Variable 
Pred. 
Signs 
 
Estimates 
INTERCEPT   -2.653 
   ( 10.602)*** 
HMD_CHAIR ?  -0.09 
   ( 1.574) 
CHAIR_FE ?  0.166 
   ( 2.559)** 
HMD_CHAIR*CHAIR_FE ?  -0.091 
   ( 0.88) 
BD_IND -  0.063 
   ( 0.371) 
CEO_TENURE +  -0.003 
   ( 0.901) 
MGMT_HOLD +  0.545 
   ( 0.661) 
MV/BV +  0.012 
   ( 2.428)** 
ABS_NICHANGE +  3.446 
   ( 8.564)*** 
NEG_NI +  -0.006 
   ( 0.076) 
LEV +  -0.342 
   ( 2.246)** 
LOG_ASSETS -  -0.129 
   ( 5.922)*** 
Joint Tests:    
    
HMD_CHAIR+HMD_CHAIR*CHAIR_FE=0 ?  -0.18 
   ( 2.087)** 
Adj R-Sq   0.07 
N   2690 
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Table 12: Supplementary Test 3
Testing if the Effects of HMD_CHAIR, HMD_FE  on FRQ  
are Conditional on HMD_AC  
 
This table reports the results of the test of the effect of HMD_AC on the association between 
HMD_CHAIR (Model 1), HMD_FE (Model 2) and FRQ. The dependent variable 
(Log_ABS_PMDA) is the natural log of the absolute value of performance matched abnormal 
accruals. See Table 2 for all variable definitions. The numbers in parenthesis are two tailed 
absolute t-statistics.  *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. 
 
          Dependent Variable: Log_ABS_PMDA 
Variable 
Pred. 
Signs Model 1 
 
Model 2 
INTERCEPT  -2.53  -2.625 
  ( 10.121)***  ( 9.702)***
HMD_CHAIR ? -0.118  
  ( 1.915)*  
HMD_CHAIR*HMD_AC ? -0.116   
  (0.94)  
HMD_FE ?   -0.141
    ( 1.785)*
HMD_FE*HMD_AC ?   0.007
    ( 0.
HMD_AC ? 0.137  0.058
  ( 1.358)  ( 0.636) 
BD_IND - 0.044  0.111
  ( 0.257)  ( 0.6) 
TENURE + -0.003  0.002
  ( 0.852)  ( 0.426) 
MGMT_HOLD + 0.576  0.378
  ( 0.699)  ( 0.449) 
MV/BV + 0.012  0.023
  ( 2.447)**  ( 4.298)***
ABS_NICHANGE + 3.486  3.504
  ( 8.664)***  ( 8.627)***
NEG_NI + 0.001  0.035
  ( 0.014)  ( 0.422) 
LEV + -0.352  -0.591
  ( 2.31)**  ( 3.594)*** 
LOG_ASSETS - -0.136  -0.133
  ( 6.156)***  ( 5.338)***
Joint Tests:
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 05) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
    
HMD_CHAIR+HMD_CHAIR*HMD_AC=0 ? -0.234   
  ( 2.173)**  
HMD_FE+HMD_FE*HMD_AC=0 ?   -0.135 
    ( 1.298)
Adj R-Sq  0.06  0.09 
N  2690  2176
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Table 13: Supplementary Test 4 
Testing the Effect of SOX on the Number of Directorships of Audit 
Committee Chair and Financial Experts using a Poisson Model 
 
This table reports the results of the SOX effect on the number of directorship of AC chair and 
financial experts. Since the dependent variable (number of directorships) is count data, I use a 
Poisson Model. Panel A is for the full sample and Panel B is for two sub samples: chair or 
financial experts with high  MD pre-SOX, chair or financial experts with low MD pre-SOX. In 
both Panel A and Panel B, Model 1 is for AC Chair and Model 2 is for AC FE. See Table 2 for all 
variable definitions. The numbers in parenthesis are two tailed absolute Z values.  *, **, ***, 
indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. 
 
Panel A: Full Sample  
                          Dependent Variable: Number of Directorships (NUM_DIR) 
Variable 
Pred. 
Signs Model 1  Model 2  
INTERCEPT  0.871 0.708 
  ( 34.239)*** ( 28.67)*** 
SOX ? -0.008 0.041 
  ( 0.329) ( 1.687)* 
CEO + 0.051 0.042 
  ( 1.072) ( 1.036) 
RETIRE - -0.119 -0.055 
  ( 4.557)*** ( 1.569) 
N  2573 2916 
 
 
Panel B: High and Low MD Sub Samples 
                 Dependent Variable: Number of Directorships (NUM_DIR) 
  CHAIR FE 
Variable 
Pred. 
Signs 
With low MD 
 pre-SOX 
With high MD
 pre-SOX 
With low MD 
 pre-SOX 
With high MD
 pre-SOX 
INTERCEPT  0.372 1.542 0.314 1.531 
  ( 18.381)*** ( 74.575)*** ( 19.023)*** ( 65.148)*** 
SOX ? 0.217 -0.25 0.256 -0.259 
  ( 6.78)*** ( 7.137)*** ( 8.551)*** ( 7.192)*** 
CEO + 0.059 -0.005 0.064 0.001 
  ( 1.496) ( 0.09) ( 1.679)* ( 0.018) 
RETIRE - -0.013 -0.017 0.031 0.042 
  ( 0.41) ( 0.418) ( 0.861) ( 0.793) 
N  1399 530 1876 419 
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Table 14: Robustness Check 1: 
Using a Different Threshold-Two Directorships-to Measure 
 High or Low-MD 
 
This table reports the results of sensitivity tests by using two directorships as a threshold to 
distinguish high and low MD. In Panel A and C, the numbers in parenthesis are two tailed absolute 
t-statistics. In Panel B, the numbers in parentheses are wald chi-square values.  See Table 2 for all 
variable definitions.  *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. 
 
Panel A: The Association between AC-MD and FRQ 
                        
                        Dependent Variable: Log_ABS_PMDA 
Variable 
Pred. 
Signs 
Model 1a: 
HMD_AC 
Model 1b: 
HMD_CHAIR 
Model 1c: 
HMD_FE 
INTERCEPT  -2.385 -2.514 -2.637 
  ( 10.654)*** ( 10.146)*** ( 9.852)*** 
HMD_AC ? -0.001   
  ( 0.02)   
HMD_CHAIR ?  -0.097  
   ( 1.95)*  
HMD_FE ?   -0.139 
    ( 2.706)*** 
BD_IND - -0.077 0.06 0.142 
  ( 0.508) ( 0.356) ( 0.771) 
CEO_TENURE + -0.003 -0.003 0.001 
  ( 0.797) ( 0.783) ( 0.323) 
MGMT_HOLD + 1.006 0.53 0.417 
  ( 1.349) ( 0.643) ( 0.496) 
MV/BV + 0.018 0.011 0.023 
  ( 4.135)*** ( 2.382)** ( 4.337)*** 
ABS_NICHANGE + 3.684 3.48 3.485 
  ( 10.198)*** ( 8.648)*** ( 8.59)*** 
NEG_NI + 0.011 -0.005 0.029 
  ( 0.152) ( 0.071) ( 0.352) 
LEV + -0.393 -0.362 -0.607 
  ( 2.832)*** ( 2.382)** ( 3.702)*** 
LOG_ASSETS - -0.155 -0.136 -0.128 
  ( 7.671)*** ( 6.258)*** ( 5.238)*** 
Adj R-Sq  0.09 0.06 0.09 
N  3169 2690 2176 
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Panel B: The SOX Effect on the Incidence of HMD_AC, HMD (CHAIR)  
                and HMD (FE) 
 
Variable 
Pred. 
Signs 
Model 4a:
HMD_AC 
Model 4b: 
HMD 
 (CHAIR) 
Model 4c: 
HMD 
(FE) 
INTERCEPT  -1.067 3.889 1.3 
  ( 0.0002) ( 0.006) ( 0.0003) 
SOX ? 0.018 0.431 0.858 
  ( 0.018) ( 2.738)* ( 16.225)*** 
MV/BV + -0.007   
  ( 0.898)   
ABS_NICHANGE - 1.949   
  ( 5.18)**   
LOG_ASSETS + 0.464   
  ( 5.228)**   
CEO +  1.135 0.919 
   ( 6.681)*** ( 5.202)** 
RETIRE -  -0.397 -0.687 
   ( 1.374) ( 3.758)* 
Likelihood-Ratio  <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Pseudo R-Sq  0.4966 0.6380 0.6590 
N  3169 2573 2916 
  Firm-years Chair-years FE-years 
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Panel C: The Effect of SOX on the Association between AC_MD and FRQ 
 
          Dependent Variable: Log_ABS_PMDA 
Variable 
Pred. 
Signs 
Model 5a: 
HMD_AC 
Model 5b: 
HMD_CHAIR 
Model 5c: 
HMD_FE 
INTERCEPT  -2.418 -2.526 -2.637 
  ( 11.61)*** ( 10.794)*** ( 10.61)*** 
SOX - -0.101 -0.229 -0.169 
  ( 1.343) ( 2.688)*** ( 2.171)** 
HMD_AC ? -0.025   
  ( 0.438)   
SOX*HMD_AC ? 0.049   
  ( 0.518)   
HMD_CHAIR ?  -0.202  
   ( 3.205)***  
SOX*HMD_CHAIR ?  0.251  
   ( 2.437)**  
HMD_FE ?   -0.202 
    ( 3.11)***
SOX*HMD_FE ?   0.161 
    ( 1.527)
BD_IND - -0.048 0.083 0.176 
  ( 0.315) ( 0.489) ( 0.948) 
CEO_TENURE + -0.003 -0.003 0.001 
  ( 0.846) ( 0.791) ( 0.344) 
MGMT_HOLD + 1.194 0.703 0.56 
  ( 1.592) ( 0.85) ( 0.663) 
MV/BV + 0.019 0.012 0.024 
  ( 4.464)*** ( 2.543)** ( 4.467)*** 
ABS_NICHANGE + 4.011 3.783 3.853 
  ( 11.066)*** ( 9.38)*** ( 9.475)*** 
NEG_NI + -0.002 -0.017 -0.001 
  ( 0.027) ( 0.219) ( 0.012) 
LEV + -0.393 -0.36 -0.612 
  ( 2.824)*** ( 2.362)** ( 3.722)*** 
LOG_ASSETS - -0.148 -0.13 -0.124 
  ( 7.326)*** ( 5.985)*** ( 5.029)*** 
Joint Tests:
 
 
     
HMD_AC+HMD_AC*SOX=0 ? 0.024   
  ( 0.315)   
HMD_CHAIR+HMD_CHAIR*SOX=0 ?  0.049  
   ( 0.597)  
HMD_FE+HMD_FE*SOX=0 ?   -0.041 
    ( 0.489)
Adj R-Sq  0.09 0.07 0.10 
N  3169 2690 2176 
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Table 15:  Robustness Check 2 
Using Broader Definition of FE: Including Supervisory Experts  
This table reports the results of sensitivity tests based on a broader definition of FE to include 
supervisory experts such as CEOs. See Table 2 for all variable definitions. In Panels A and C, the 
numbers in parenthesis are two tailed absolute t-statistics. In Panel B, the numbers in parentheses 
are wald chi-square values. *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: The Association between HMD_FE and FRQ  
 
                                                  Dependent variable: Log_ABS_PMDA 
Variable 
Pred. 
Signs 
 Model 1c: 
HMD_FE 
INTERCEPT   -2.398 
   ( 10.662)*** 
HMD_FE ?  -0.025 
   ( 0.338) 
BD_IND -  -0.071 
   ( 0.466) 
CEO_TENURE +  -0.003 
   ( 0.79) 
MGMT_HOLD +  1.047 
   ( 1.389) 
MV/BV +  0.017 
   ( 4.034)*** 
ABS_NICHANGE +  3.777 
   ( 10.388)*** 
NEG_NI +  0.01 
   ( 0.147) 
LEV +  -0.393 
   ( 2.813)*** 
LOG_ASSETS -  -0.154 
   ( 7.674)*** 
Adj R-Sq   0.09 
N   3139 
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Panel B: The SOX Effect on the Incidence of HMD (FE) 
 
Variable 
Pred. 
Signs 
Model 4c: 
HMD (FE) 
INTERCEPT  -5.548 
  ( 0.006) 
SOX ? 0.498 
  ( 17.49)*** 
CEO + 0.365 
  ( 4.33)** 
RETIRE - -2.336 
  ( 149.303)*** 
Likelihood-Ratio  <0.0001 
Pseudo R-Sq  0.6365 
N  9224 
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Panel C: The SOX Effect on the Association between HMD_FE and FRQ 
 
                          Dependent variable: Log_ABS_PMDA 
Variable 
Pred. 
Signs 
 Model 5c: 
HMD_FE 
INTERCEPT   -2.441 
   ( 11.708)*** 
SOX -  -0.092 
   ( 1.859)* 
HMD_FE ?  -0.116 
   ( 1.341) 
SOX*HMD_FE ?  0.273 
   ( 1.721)* 
BD_IND -  -0.043 
   ( 0.28) 
CEO_TENURE +  -0.003 
   ( 0.829) 
MGMT_HOLD +  1.22 
   ( 1.61) 
MV/BV +  0.019 
   ( 4.376)*** 
ABS_NICHANGE +  4.092 
   ( 11.217)*** 
NEG_NI +  -0.001 
   ( 0.013) 
LEV +  -0.397 
   ( 2.838)*** 
LOG_ASSETS -  -0.147 
   ( 7.299)*** 
Joint Test:    
HMD_FE+HMD_FE*SOX=0 ?  0.157 
   ( 1.178) 
Adj R-Sq   0.09 
N   3139 
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Table 16: Robustness Check 3 
Using Alternative Measurement of SOX (eliminate year 2002) 
 
Panel A: The SOX Effect on the Incidence of HMD_AC, HMD (CHAIR) and 
HMD (FE) 
                   
Variable 
Pred. 
Signs 
Model 4a:  
HMD_AC 
Model 4b: 
HMD(CHAIR) 
Model 4c:  
HMD (FE) 
INTERCEPT  -7.56 -3.328 -6.82 
  ( 0.024) ( 0.005) ( 0.007) 
SOX ? -0.427 0.808 0.739 
  ( 8.316)*** ( 7.342)*** ( 9.319)*** 
MV/BV + 0.007   
  ( 1.822)   
ABS_NICHANGE - 0.103   
  ( 0.01)   
LOG_ASSETS + 0.146   
  ( 0.496)   
CEO +  0.246 -0.023 
   ( 0.284) ( 0.004) 
RETIRE -  -2.63 -1.387 
   ( 41.649)*** ( 12.219)*** 
Likelihood-Ratio  <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Pseudo R-Sq  0.4291 0.6605 0.6187 
N  2805 2249 2557 
  Firm-years Chair-years FE-years 
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Panel B: The Effect of SOX on the Association between AC_MD and FRQ   
 
                  Dependent Variable: Log_ABS_PMDA 
Variable 
Pred. 
Signs 
Model 5a: 
HMD_AC 
Model 5b: 
HMD_CHAIR 
Model 5c: 
HMD_FE 
INTERCEPT  -2.541 -2.772 -2.799 
  ( 11.326)*** ( 11.019)*** ( 10.515)*** 
SOX - -0.106 -0.103 -0.138 
  ( 1.842)* ( 1.513) ( 2.01)** 
HMD_AC ? -0.048   
  ( 0.732)   
SOX*HMD_AC ? 0.207   
  ( 1.892)*   
HMD_CHAIR ?  -0.176  
   ( 2.577)**  
SOX*HMD_CHAIR ?  0.148  
   ( 1.434)  
HMD_FE ?   -0.165 
    ( 2.099)**
SOX*HMD_FE ?   0.213 
    ( 1.745)*
BD_IND - -0.05 0.074 0.166 
  ( 0.31) ( 0.408) ( 0.84) 
CEO_TENURE + -0.003 -0.003 0.002 
  ( 0.801) ( 0.757) ( 0.487) 
MGMT_HOLD + 1.628 1.234 0.932 
  ( 2.021)** ( 1.384) ( 1.028) 
MV/BV + 0.022 0.016 0.031 
  ( 4.856)*** ( 3.084)*** ( 5.416)*** 
ABS_NICHANGE + 4.023 3.776 3.831 
  ( 10.229)*** ( 8.487)*** ( 8.72)*** 
NEG_NI + -0.045 -0.09 -0.012 
  ( 0.565) ( 1.055) ( 0.13) 
LEV + -0.252 -0.199 -0.49 
  ( 1.695)* ( 1.212) ( 2.784)*** 
LOG_ASSETS - -0.141 -0.116 -0.118 
  ( 6.453)*** ( 4.903)*** ( 4.487)*** 
Joint Tests:
 
 
     
     
HMD_AC+HMD_AC*SOX=0 ? 0.159   
  ( 1.791)*   
HMD_CHAIR+HMD_CHAIR*SOX=0 ?  -0.027  
   ( 0.348)  
HMD_FE+HMD_FE*SOX=0 ?   0.048 
    ( 0.509)
Adj R-Sq  0.09 0.06 0.10 
N  2805 2359 1913 
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Table 17: Robustness Check 4 
Controlling for Audit Committee Activity and Size 
 
This table reports the results of additional tests of H1: the association between AC MD and FRQ 
after controlling for audit committee activity (proxied for by audit committee meeting frequency) 
and audit committee size. See Table 2 for all variable definitions. The numbers in parenthesis are 
two tailed absolute t-statistics.  *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels 
respectively. 
           Dependent Variable: Log_ABS_PMDA 
Variable 
Pred. 
Signs 
Model 1a 
HMD_AC 
Model 1b 
HMD_CHAIR 
Model 1c 
HMD_FE 
INTERCEPT  -1.993 -2.152 -2.424 
  ( 7.275)*** ( 7.138)*** ( 7.462)*** 
HMD_AC ? -0.028   
  ( 0.466)   
HMD_CHAIR ?  -0.148  
   ( 2.493)**  
HMD_FE ?   -0.248 
    ( 3.56)*** 
BD_IND - 0.006 0.124 0.233 
  ( 0.035) ( 0.585) ( 1.026) 
AC_MEET a - -0.006 -0.007 -0.002 
  ( 0.565) ( 0.622) ( 0.196) 
AC_SIZE a - -0.041 -0.018 -0.031 
  ( 1.735)* ( 0.67) ( 1.184) 
CEO_TENURE + -0.006 -0.007 0 
 ( 1.427) ( 1.556) ( 0.083) 
MGMT_HOLD + 0.954 0.359 0.087 
  ( 1.091) ( 0.365) ( 0.088) 
MV/BV + 0.028 0.02 0.041 
  ( 5.359)*** ( 3.342)*** ( 6.017)*** 
ABS_NICHANGE + 3.503 3.247 3.246 
  ( 8.345)*** ( 6.794)*** ( 6.949)*** 
NEG_NI + -0.007 -0.007 -0.013 
  ( 0.082) ( 0.071) ( 0.13) 
LEV + -0.352 -0.336 -0.606 
  ( 2.051)** ( 1.771)* ( 3.036)*** 
LOG_ASSETS - -0.181 -0.173 -0.148 
  ( 7.21)*** ( 6.364)*** ( 4.887)*** 
Adj R-Sq  0.12 0.09 0.13 
N  2002 1683 1373 
 
 
                                              a I obtain the similar results when I use  the natural logarithms of AC_MEET and AC_SIZE in the model.  
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Table 18: Robustness Check 5 
Addressing the Endogeneity Issue Using the Heckman  
Two Step Treatment Effects Model 
 
This table reports the results of tests of the association between Audit Committee Multiple 
Directorships and Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ) by considering the Endogeneity issue. Panel 
A reports the first stage regressions and Panel B reports the treatment regressions. In Panel A, the 
dependent variables are HMD_AC, HMD_CHAIR and HMD_FE. In Panel B, the dependent 
variable (Log_ABS_PMDA) is the natural log of the absolute value of performance matched 
abnormal accruals. In Panel A, the numbers in parenthesis are Wald Chi-Square statistics. In panel 
B, the numbers in parenthesis are two tailed absolute t-statistics.  See Table 2 for all variable 
definitions.  *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. 
 
Panel A: First-stage Regressions 
                              
                     Dependent variable: HMD_AC, HMD_CHAIR or HMD_FE 
Pred. 
Signs HMD_AC HMD_CHAIR HMD_FE 
INTERCEPT  -3.025 -1.929 -2.404 
  ( 148.938)*** ( 57.702)*** ( 67.727)*** 
LAG_LOG_ABS_
PMDA 
- 0.027 -0.06 -0.037 
  ( 1.763) ( 8.822)*** ( 2.429) 
BD_IND + 0.79 0.12 -0.107 
  ( 20.043)*** ( 0.448) ( 0.261) 
CEO_TENURE - -0.008 -0.01 -0.01 
  ( 3.578)* ( 6.032)** ( 4.503)** 
MGMT_HOLD - -0.997 0.733 -0.661 
  ( 1.212) ( 0.705) ( 0.46) 
MV/BV + 0.014 0.013 0.023 
  ( 8.986)*** ( 6.762)*** ( 16.087)*** 
NEG_NI - -0.092 0.012 -0.064 
  ( 1.259) ( 0.022) ( 0.45) 
ABS_NICHANGE - 0.174 0.487 0.462 
  ( 0.174) ( 1.286) ( 0.987) 
LEV - -0.469 -0.142 -0.185 
  ( 8.581)*** ( 0.775) ( 0.987) 
LOG_MV + 0.229 0.158 0.204 
  ( 103.368)*** ( 47.004)*** ( 54.562)*** 
N  3169 2690 2176 
Likelihood-Ratio  <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Pseudo R-Sq  0.0547 0.0300 0.0378 
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Panel B: Treatment Regressions 
 
(1) Full Sample – Excluding SOX Effect (test of H1) 
 
                             Dependent variable: Log_ABS_PMDA 
Variable 
Pred. 
Signs 
Model 1a: 
HMD_AC 
Model 1b: 
HMD_CHAIR 
Model 1c: 
HMD_FE 
INTERCEPT  -2.388 -2.534 -2.62 
  ( 10.684)*** ( 10.239)*** ( 9.786)*** 
HMD_AC ? 0.006   
  ( 0.195)   
HMD_CHAIR ?  -0.068  
   ( 2.306)**  
HMD_FE ?   -0.063 
    ( 1.855)* 
BD_IND - -0.08 0.056 0.125 
  ( 0.53) ( 0.328) ( 0.677) 
CEO_TENURE + -0.003 -0.003 0.002 
  ( 0.807) ( 0.692) ( 0.469) 
MGMT_HOLD + 1.015 0.505 0.424 
  ( 1.361) ( 0.612) ( 0.504) 
MV/BV + 0.018 0.011 0.022 
  ( 4.152)*** ( 2.315)** ( 4.213)*** 
ABS_NICHANGE + 3.685 3.482 3.487 
  ( 10.203)*** ( 8.657)*** ( 8.589)*** 
NEG_NI + 0.011 -0.002 0.039 
  ( 0.161) ( 0.031) ( 0.468) 
LEV + -0.388 -0.352 -0.584 
  ( 2.805)*** ( 2.319)** ( 3.558)*** 
LOG_ASSETS - -0.154 -0.141 -0.137 
  ( 7.765)*** ( 6.52)*** ( 5.645)*** 
Adj R-Sq  0.09 0.06 0.09 
N  3169 2690 2176 
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Panel B: Treatment Regressions 
 
           (2) SOX Interaction Effects (test of H3) 
 
              Dependent variable: Log_ABS_PMDA 
Variable 
Pred. 
Signs 
Model 3a: 
HMD_AC 
Model 3b: 
HMD_CHAIR 
Model 3c: 
HMD_FE 
INTERCEPT  -2.393 -2.587 -2.616 
  ( 11.602)*** ( 11.21)*** ( 10.633)*** 
SOX - -0.032 -0.023 -0.057 
  ( 0.713) ( 0.487) ( 1.085) 
HMD_AC ? -0.025   
  ( 0.638)   
SOX*HMD_AC ? 0.07   
  ( 1.179)   
HMD_CHAIR ?  -0.097  
   ( 2.312)**  
SOX*HMD_CHAIR ?  0.057  
   ( 0.964)  
HMD_FE ?   -0.095 
    ( 2.028)** 
SOX*HMD_FE ?   0.068 
    ( 0.997) 
BD_IND - -0.061 0.072 0.143 
  ( 0.402) ( 0.426) ( 0.777) 
CEO_TENURE + -0.003 -0.003 0.002 
  ( 0.87) ( 0.738) ( 0.441) 
MGMT_HOLD + 1.078 0.58 0.434 
  ( 1.447) ( 0.705) ( 0.517) 
MV/BV + 0.019 0.012 0.023 
  ( 4.426)*** ( 2.464)** ( 4.383)*** 
ABS_NICHANGE + 3.721 3.509 3.52 
  ( 10.339)*** ( 8.755)*** ( 8.718)*** 
NEG_NI + 0.015 -0.004 0.037 
  ( 0.209) ( 0.055) ( 0.447) 
LEV + -0.388 -0.348 -0.599 
  ( 2.815)*** ( 2.297)** ( 3.67)*** 
LOG_ASSETS - -0.152 -0.139 -0.135 
  ( 7.684)*** ( 6.438)*** ( 5.611)*** 
Joint Tests:     
HMD_AC+HMD_AC*SOX=0 ? 0.045   
  ( 1.011)   
HMD_CHAIR+HMD_CHAIR*SOX=0 ?  -0.04  
   ( 0.945)  
HMD_FE+HMD_FE*SOX=0 ?   -0.028 
    ( 0.563) 
Adj R-Sq  0.09 0.06 0.09 
N  3169 2690 2176 
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 Table 19: Summary of Results 
 
This table summarizes the results of main tests, supplementary tests and robustness checks.  See 
Table 2 for all variable definitions. 
 
 Main tests  Supplementary tests Robustness checks 
H1: 
The effects of AC-
MD (HMD_AC, 
HMD_CHAIR and 
HMD_FE) on 
financial reporting 
quality (FRQ) 
 
HMD_AC is not 
significantly associated with 
financial reporting quality 
for the entire sample. 
 
High MD among key audit 
committee members – audit 
committee chairs 
(HMD_CHAIR) and audit 
committee financial experts 
(HMD_FE) - is positively 
related to common proxies 
of financial reporting 
quality.  
 
The results are consistent 
across three different 
proxies of financial 
reporting quality, namely 
abnormal accruals, 
accounting restatements and 
earnings informativeness. a
There is an inverted U-
Shaped relationship 
between the magnitude 
of multiple directorships 
and financial reporting 
quality, with an optimum 
percentage of high MD 
members of about 47%.  
 
Also, the effect of 
HMD_CHAIR on final 
reporting quality is 
mostly driven by audit 
committee chairs who 
are also financial 
experts. 
 
In addition, the effect of 
HMD_FE on financial 
reporting quality is 
mainly driven by firms 
with low AC-MD.  
Robust to different 
threshold to distinguish 
high from low MD;  
 
Robust to different 
specifications of pre and 
post SOX; 
 
Robust to the control of 
AC meeting frequency and 
size;  
 
Robust to the control of 
endogeneity issue;  
 
However, the effect of  
HMD_FE on FRQ is 
sensitive to the definition 
of FE, and applies only to a 
strict definition of FE as 
accounting experts.  When 
supervisory experts, such 
as CEO are included as 
financial experts, I do not 
find a significant 
association between 
HMD_FE and FRQ.  
H2: The SOX 
effects on the 
incidence of MD 
(HMD_AC, 
HMD(CHAIR) and 
HMD(FE) ) 
Audit committees as a 
whole tend to have lower 
MD post-SOX. 
 
However, key audit 
committee members, AC 
chairs and financial experts, 
are more likely to have 
higher MD post-SOX. 
The increases in MD of 
AC chairs or financial 
experts post-SOX are 
largely due to chairs and 
financial experts with 
low-MD pre-SOX 
increasing their 
directorships post-SOX.  
 
Those with high MD pre 
SOX actually reduce the 
number of their 
directorships post SOX. 
Robust to different 
threshold to distinguish 
high or low MD;  
 
Robust to different 
measurements of SOX; 
 
Robust to the different 
definitions of FE.  
H3: The SOX 
effects on the 
association between 
AC-MD 
(HMD_AC, 
HMD_CHAIR and 
HMD_FE) and 
financial reporting 
quality 
 
SOX mitigates the positive 
effects of HMD_CHAIR 
and HMD_FE on financial 
reporting quality that are 
observed earlier.  
 
The results are consistent 
across two different proxies 
of financial reporting 
quality, namely abnormal 
accruals, and earnings 
informativeness. 
N/A 
Robust to different 
threshold to distinguish 
high or low MD;  
 
Robust to different 
measurements of SOX;  
 
Robust to the control of 
endogeneity issue. 
a. Except that HMD_CHAIR is negatively associated with earning informativeness, suggesting 
that market perceives the difference between HMD_CHAIR and HMD_FE. 
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